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WHEN POLICE VOLUNTEER TO KILL
Alexandra L. Klein
Abstract
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of lethal injection,
yet states continue to struggle with drug shortages and botched
executions. Some states have authorized alternative methods of
execution, including the firing squad. Utah, which has consistently
carried out firing squad executions throughout its history, relies on police
officers from the jurisdiction where the crime took place to volunteer to
carry out these executions. This represents a plausible—and probable—
method for other states in conducting firing squad executions.
Public and academic discussion of the firing squad has centered on
questions of pain and suffering. It has not engaged with the consequences
of relying on police officers as executioners. Police participation in
executions deserves the same scrutiny as physician participation in
executions. Using police officers as executioners is inconsistent with the
normative and idealized functions of policing, but consistent with the
culture and powers of policing. This Article explores the potential
consequences of using police officers as executioners. Relying on police
officers as executioners will destabilize policing because it encourages
negative aspects of policing culture and undermines officers’ ability to
work within their communities.
This practice also risks adding impermissible features to executions,
further undermining the retributive justifications for capital punishment.
Using police officers from the jurisdiction where the crime occurred has
a significant association with retributive and expressive functions of
punishment. Pain alone should not be the primary way to assess the
constitutionality of an execution. The Eighth Amendment prohibits
punishment that fails to serve legitimate purposes. The Supreme Court
has justified capital punishment as an expression of a community’s moral
outrage and a way to preserve the legitimacy of the justice system by
preventing vigilantism and mob violence. This means that punishment
must not be undertaken in a way that endorses vigilantism and vengeance.
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Relying on police officers as executioners in firing squads illustrates that
the search for a less painful method of execution may not be without its
own serious constitutional defects.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1977, Gary Gilmore became the first person put to
death since the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of capital
punishment in Gregg v. Georgia1 approximately six and a half months
earlier.2 He died by firing squad in the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah.3
Since that day, two other men have died by firing squad in the United
States.4 The most recent firing squad execution took place in 2010, when
Utah executed Ronnie Lee Gardner.5 The firing squad is by no means a
1. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 275 (Harvard
Univ. Press 2002) (observing that, although Gregg confirmed the constitutionality of the death
penalty, the methods of execution continue to spark debate); L. KAY GILLESPIE, THE UNFORGIVEN:
UTAH’S EXECUTED MEN 151 (2d ed. 1997).
3. GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 151.
4. Utah has executed seven people since 1977, three by firing squad—including
Gilmore—and four by lethal injection. See Utah State Prison: Death Row Inmates, UTAH DEP’T
OF CORR. 4–5 (Aug. 2021), https://corrections.utah.gov/images/UtahdeathrowAugust2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XV2L-FJKF].
5. See Nate Carlisle, Firing Squad: An Eyewitness Account of Gardner’s Execution, SALT
LAKE TRIB. (June 18, 2010, 8:05 PM), https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=9789613&itype
=storyID [https://perma.cc/Z97B-5JAR]; Jennifer Dobner, Associated Press, Ronnie Lee Gardner
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common method of execution in the United States, but it may play an
important role in the next phase of capital punishment in the United
States.
Lethal injection is the primary method of execution for states and the
federal government.6 Despite court rulings upholding the
constitutionality of lethal injection,7 states have struggled with actually
carrying out such executions.8 States face shortages of lethal injection
drugs due to manufacturers’ reluctance to allow their products to be used
for executions.9 States have also botched lethal injection executions at an
alarming rate.10 In response to these difficulties, states have considered
new methods of execution, including the firing squad. The imminent
possibility of such executions11 raises significant constitutional and legal
questions.

Executed by Firing Squad in Utah, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 18, 2010),
https://www.csmonitor.com/From-the-news-wires/2010/0618/Ronnie-Lee-Gardner-executed-by
-firing-squad-in-Utah [https://perma.cc/T9P9-SXF3]; Emiley Morgan, Ronnie Lee Gardner
Executed by Firing Squad, DESERET NEWS (June 18, 2010, 12:21 AM), https://www.deseret.com/
2010/6/18/20122257/ronnie-lee-gardner-executed-by-firing-squad#ronnie-lee-gardners-daughter
-brandie-gardner-right-is-comforted-by-a-friend-as-family-members-and-others-held-a-vigilbefore-the-execution [https://perma.cc/GUG4-HYU9].
6. See Alexandra Klein, Nondelegating Death, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 923, 948 (2020); Methods
of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-ofexecution [https://perma.cc/VQ6V-94U3].
7. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion); Glossip v. Gross,
576 U.S. 863, 869 (2015); Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1126 (2019).
8. See Eric Berger, Courts, Culture, and the Lethal Injection Stalemate, 62 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1, 23 (2020).
9. See CORINNA BARRETT LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION: WHY WE CAN’T GET IT RIGHT AND
WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT US ch. 8 (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the author); Berger, supra
note 8, at 37–42.
10. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN
REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 195–202 (2017); AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED
EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 120–23 (2014); Deborah W. Denno, Lethal
Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1364 (2014) (finding that a shortage of lethal
injection drugs, unqualified administrators of the drugs, and generally unsafe procedures have
consistently caused painful deaths for inmates); see also Robin C. Konrad, Lethal Injection: A
Horrendous Brutality, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1127, 1133–37 (2016) (describing the execution
of Joseph Wood); Ben Crair, Photos from a Botched Lethal Injection, NEW REPUBLIC (May
29, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117898/lethal-injection-photos-angel-diazs-botchedexecution-florida [https://perma.cc/8743-5ANR] (discussing the execution of Angel Diaz);
Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton Lockett, ATLANTIC (June 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-clayton-lockett/392069/
[https://perma.cc/5CHW-2WYS] (describing the execution of Clayton Lockett).
11. See infra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
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Four states have designated the firing squad as a possible method of
execution, most recently South Carolina in 2021.12 South Carolina
recently developed a firing squad execution protocol and completed the
necessary alterations to its execution chamber to carry out such
executions.13 Other states have considered adopting it.14 In method-ofexecution litigation, the firing squad has been identified as a readily
available alternative method of execution15 that may reduce a substantial
risk of serious pain.16 Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor has observed that the
12. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(4) (2021) (stating that if other methods of execution
are held unconstitutional or are otherwise unavailable, execution shall be done by firing squad);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(D) (West 2021) (finding that if other execution methods are
unconstitutional or unavailable, inmates shall be executed by firing squad); S.C. CODE ANN. § 243-530(A) (LexisNexis 2021) (stating that an inmate may elect for execution by firing squad);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-113(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2021) (stating that if a court holds that a
defendant has a right to be executed by firing squad, the method of execution for that defendant
shall be by firing squad). Idaho authorized execution by firing squad if lethal injection was
impractical but amended its method of execution statute in 2009, leaving lethal injection as its
sole method. See H.B. 107, 60th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2009); Deborah W. Denno, The Firing
Squad as a “Known and Available Alternative Method of Execution” Post-Glossip, 49 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 749, 780 (2016). Several jurisdictions, while not expressly authorizing the firing
squad as a method of execution, have a “catch-all” provision in their method of execution statutes
that allow for the use of any constitutional method of execution in the event that the state’s primary
method of execution is held unconstitutional, which presumably would include a firing squad. See
Klein, supra note 6, at 950.
13. See Jaclyn Diaz, Death Row Executions by Firing Squad Can Now be Carried Out in
South Carolina, NPR (Mar. 18, 2022, 9:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2022/03/18/1087677686/
south-carolina-firing-squad-execution-death-row [https://perma.cc/9DVC-Z43K]; infra notes
128–29 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Liz Fields, Wyoming Is the Latest State to Consider Bringing Back Firing
Squads, VICE (Jan. 26, 2015, 4:40 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvayjd/wyoming-isthe-latest-state-to-consider-bringing-back-firing-squads [https://perma.cc/4LP8-ELFY]; Alex
Stuckey, Missouri Bill Would Allow Execution Using Firing Squad, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/missouri-bill-wouldallow-execution-using-firing-squad/article_2a60d84c-f66b-5262-9da9-bb2a59264c81.html
[https://perma.cc/N68P-UWJV].
15. Under the analysis set out in the Baze plurality, and subsequently affirmed in Glossip,
a prisoner challenging a state’s method of execution must show that the method presents a
substantial risk of serious harm and identify an alternative method of execution that is readily
available and significantly reduces the substantial risk of serious pain or harm. See Baze v. Rees,
553 U.S. 35, 50–52 (2008) (plurality opinion); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 876–77 (2015).
See also Arthur v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corrections, 840 F.3d 1268, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016)
(alleging Utah’s firing squad protocol as an alternative method of execution in Alabama).
16. See Glossip, 576 U.S. at 976–77 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (identifying evidence to
suggest that the firing squad is more reliable and relatively painless compared with other methods
of execution); Boyd v. Warden, Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 880–81 (11th Cir. 2017)
(Wilson, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding that the defendant’s allegations supported a
reasonable inference that execution by firing squad was feasible and readily implemented); Arthur
v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268, 1321 (11th Cir. 2016) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
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firing squad “has yielded significantly fewer botched executions,” and
may be “near instant” and “comparatively painless.”17 A trial has been
scheduled in the Middle District of Tennessee for April 2022 to evaluate
this question.18 Recently, Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, while declining to
“prejudge” the firing squad’s feasibility in every state, suggested the
firing squad could serve as a readily available alternative for prisoners
trying to satisfy Baze-Glossip, even if a state had not authorized that
method of execution.19
Given states’ tendencies to copy execution protocols from other
jurisdictions, it is highly likely that, should another jurisdiction conduct
an execution by firing squad, Utah’s procedure for selecting executioners
might serve as a reference point for other states’ procedures.20 Prisoners
attempting to prove that the firing squad is a readily available alternative

(asserting that the firing squad may be a viable alternative method of execution under Baze and
Glossip), abrogated by Nance v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 981 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2020); Wood v.
Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc) (arguing that the firing squad is a more appropriate method of execution than sanitized lethal
injection), vacated, 573 U.S. 976 (2014); Johnson v. Precythe, No. 20-287, slip op. at 1–2 (May
24, 2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Nance, 981 F.3d at 1205
(asserting the firing squad as an alternative to Georgia’s lethal injection protocol); Ledford v. Ga.
Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2017) (same); McGehee v. Hutchinson, 463 F.
Supp. 3d 870, 915–16 (E.D. Ark. 2020) (considering whether the evidence was sufficient to show
that the firing squad reduced a substantial risk of severe pain); Kelley v. Johnson, 496 S.W.3d
346, 358 (Ark. 2016); Boyd v. Myers, No. 2:14-CV-1017, 2015 WL 5852948, at *4 (M.D. Ala.
Oct. 7, 2015), aff’d, 856 F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 2017); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Boyd
v. Dunn, No. 17-962 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2017); Complaint at 30, 32, Gray v. McAuliffe, No. 3:16-cv000982, 2017 WL 102970 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2017).
17. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 733–34 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
18. See Kimberlee Kruesi, Trial Set for Death Row Inmates Seeking Firing Squad Option,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/trials-crime-tennessee-executions00051c6a21a6b3a06aaf89d2d16bf810 [https://perma.cc/8B23-59DX].
19. Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1136 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
20. See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment,
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2010)
(discussing state copying); Klein, supra note 6, at 972–73; Stuckey, supra note 14 (“The
[Missouri] House bill adds the option of firing squad executions consisting of five law
enforcement officers chosen by the state corrections director.”); Tim Smith, As SC Looks at Firing
Squad as an Option, Utah May Provide a Template, GREENVILLE NEWS (Apr. 30, 2019, 9:41 AM),
https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/local/south-carolina/2018/02/15/how-firing-squads
-work-utah-only-state-executions/338012002/ [https://perma.cc/B4QJ-4FB8]; Caitlin Herrington,
SC is now Prepared to Use a Firing Squad for Executions as Greenville Men Wait for Death,
GREENVILLE NEWS (Mar. 18, 2022, 3:38 PM), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/
local/south-carolina/2022/03/18/sc-now-firing-squad-capital-punishment-executions/9445469002/
[https://perma.cc/3ZLV-CZXZ] (noting that South Carolina officials visited Utah when
developing their protocol).
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have cited Utah’s procedures.21 Utah’s firing squad is composed of
“POST certified peace officers.”22 This practice is a significant part of
Utah’s history of capital punishment: firing squads have traditionally
been composed of volunteer law enforcement officers, usually from the
jurisdiction where the crime occurred.23 There may be practical reasons
to rely on law enforcement officers as firing squad executioners. But there
are also consequences to offering police an opportunity to engage in
judicially sanctioned killing. Understanding these consequences affords
an opportunity to reevaluate what it means when police punish—or kill.
Legal scholarship examining the firing squad has focused on
questions of pain and suffering.24 It has also explored whether firing
21. See, e.g., Complaint at 30, Gray, 2017 WL 102970 (No. 3:16-cv-000982) (identifying
the number of state and local law enforcement officers in Virginia and explaining that “[i]t is
feasible for the VDOC to find a group of these trained officers to conduct a firing-squad
execution”); Boyd, 856 F.3d at 880–81 (Wilson, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that Boyd
relies on Utah’s protocol); Opening Brief of Appellant at 47, Nance, 981 F.3d 1201 (No. 2011393) (noting petitioner’s argument highlighting Utah’s firing squad protocol as an example of
its implementation in other states); Complaint at 37, McGehee, 463 F. Supp. 3d 870 (No. 17-CV00179) (pointing to Utah’s firing squad procedure and protocol as an established reference);
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Dunn, No. 17-962 (arguing that petitioner presented a
reasonable inference that the firing squad is a feasible and readily implemented alternative and
identifying Utah’s use of the firing squad as a known alternative); see also Kimberly Kruesi,
Associated Press, Four Tennessee Death Row Inmates Ask for Execution by Firing Squad,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/05/tenn
essee-death-row-inmates-execution-firing-squad [https://perma.cc/4DWX-RTNJ] (describing the
arguments made in favor of execution by firing squad by four Tennessee death row inmates and
identifying Utah as the state that most recently used the firing squad as a method of execution).
22. UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., TECHNICAL MANUAL 54 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(3)
(LexisNexis 2021) (“If the judgment of death is to be carried out by firing squad . . . the executive
director of the department or a designee shall select a five-person firing squad of peace officers.”).
Utah police officers are peace officers, although other types of officers may “exercise peace
officer authority.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-13-102 (LexisNexis 2021). “POST” refers to “Peace
Officer Standards and Training.” Peace Officer Standards and Training: Basic Training Bureau,
UTAH DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, https://post.utah.gov/about-post-2/basic-training-bureau/
[https://perma.cc/S7CX-PBFB]. Aspiring peace officers in Utah must complete “POST Basic
Training” and “receive basic training before they can be certified and function with any authority
in the state.” Id.
23. See Jennifer Dobner, Associated Press, Utah Cops Volunteer for Firing Squad Duty,
POLICEONE.COM (June 18, 2010), https://www.policeone.com/patrol-issues/articles/utah-copsvolunteer-for-firing-squad-duty-6BP7xnnKvOIQrt4r/ [https://perma.cc/276C-HCLY]; Brady
McCombs, Utah’s Firing Squad: How Does It Work?, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://apnews.com/58559881d0f743009cfeb52196702382 [https://perma.cc/J3R9-MEX3].
24. See Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less Than the Dignity of Man: Evolving Standards,
Botched Executions and Utah’s Controversial Use of the Firing Squad, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335,
370 (2003); Denno, supra note 12, at 777; Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an
Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 551, 688–89 (1994); Martin R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities—An Eighth
Amendment Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96, 123–
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squads are more consistent with the reality of executions, in contrast with
the sanitized optics of lethal injection.25 This scholarship has also
assessed the firing squad’s potential for enhancing retributive and
deterrent messages.26 Although these are important issues, capital
punishment scholarship has not engaged with who carries out firing squad
executions in the same way it has explored physician involvement in
lethal injection. This Article contributes to the literature on capital
punishment by examining the role of executioners on firing squads, the
justifications associated with the choice to use law enforcement officers
as executioners, and the potential consequences of that choice on the
legitimacy of capital punishment. This practice has not been adequately
explored, even where it has been used. Legislative debates over the firing
squad revealed that, even in Utah, some legislators were unaware that
police served as executioners.27 They did not discuss whether it was
sound public policy or whether there might be consequences from that
choice.
Using police officers as executioners raises important questions,
particularly because it is inconsistent with the normative, or idealized,
function of policing. Using police officers as executioners is, however,
remarkably consistent with the culture and powers of policing. This
Article draws upon the growing body of policing scholarship to evaluate
the potential harm to policing and communities from voluntary police
participation in firing squads. It contributes to recent scholarship and
public conversation about the role of police officers in American society
and police killings by exploring the relationship between policing and
punishment, particularly the negative consequences of allowing police to
punish.
25 (1978); Andrew Jensen Kerr, Facing the Firing Squad, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 74, 83 (2015);
Stephanie Moran, Note, A Modest Proposal: The Federal Government Should Use Firing Squads
To Execute Federal Death Row Inmates, 74 U. MIA. L. REV. 276, 302 (2019); P. Thomas
DiStanislao, III, Comment, A Shot in the Dark: Why Virginia Should Adopt the Firing Squad as
Its Primary Method of Execution, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 779, 799–802 (2015); Alexander Vey, Note,
No Clean Hands in a Dirty Business: Firing Squads and the Euphemism of “Evolving Standards
of Decency”, 69 VAND. L. REV. 545, 575–77 (2016).
25. See DiStanislao, supra note 24, at 799–801 (comparing lethal injection and firing squad
executions).
26. See Kerr, supra note 24, at 83, 85–86 (discussing the potential for increased dignity in
firing squad executions and enhanced deterrence); DiStanislao, supra note 24, at 802–04 (briefly
discussing deterrence and retribution to support an argument that Virginia should adopt the firing
squad); Vey, supra note 24, at 582 (observing that “turning to an older, more ‘brutal’ method
could go too far toward promoting retribution,” but concluding that these concerns would not
prohibit firing squad executions). Deborah Denno has evaluated whether other methods of
execution like lethal injection and electrocution comport with the justifications for capital
punishment. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82
IOWA L. REV. 319, 351–52 (1997).
27. See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
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The firing squad may be less painful than other methods of execution,
but pain should not be the primary gauge for permissibility of a method
of execution.28 In 1976, the Supreme Court justified capital punishment
as a way to channel retributive and vengeful impulses and reduce
vigilantism.29 The Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment when
it fails to serve a legitimate punitive purpose.30 Methods of execution that
invite vengeance undermine legitimate penological purposes and are
inconsistent with the values the Eighth Amendment protects. Justifying
capital punishment on the grounds that it discourages extrajudicial
executions, lynching, vigilantism, and mob violence requires that the
punishment must not be undertaken in a way that mimics or encourages
them. Relying on police officers as executioners has significant potential
to do just that by transforming executions into a personal exercise of
public retaliation and vengeance.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I offers a history of the firing
squad in Utah, the state that has most consistently used it as a method of
execution. It describes past and present protocols, as well as the role law
enforcement has played in executions. Part I also explores the legislative
history surrounding two states’ decisions about the firing squad: Utah
and, most recently, South Carolina. Part II explores issues of police
violence and its role in punishment, especially the legal and cultural
frameworks that justify or excuse police violence. It argues that police
lack the power to punish and explores the potential consequences of
allowing police to do so, which include enhancing negative aspects of
policing culture and undermining community trust. Part III weaves these
components together, arguing that police participation in executions
undermines the legitimacy of capital punishment and policing. The
Supreme Court has justified capital punishment as a social-stabilizing
exercise in channeled retribution. If it is undertaken in a way that
undermines that function, by encouraging vengeance and weakening the
criminal legal system, then it no longer serves its constitutional
justification and is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the
Eighth Amendment.
I. FIRING SQUADS
The firing squad, although used most prominently in Utah,31 is part of
the long history of capital punishment in the United States. The first
28. See Gardner, supra note 24, at 108–09 (arguing that human dignity is critical to the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment).
29. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
30. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
31. See GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 21; Martin R. Gardner, Illicit Legislative Motivation as
a Sufficient Condition for Unconstitutionality Under the Establishment Clause—A Case for
Consideration: The Utah Firing Squad, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 435, 438–40.
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recorded execution in the American colonies was by firing squad, 32 as
was the first post-Gregg execution.33 Nevada has used the firing squad
once.34 Before their admission to the United States, several regions in the
Midwest, as well as Texas and California, used the firing squad.35 It has
also been used in military executions.36 Approximately 144 individuals
have died after being shot by a firing squad in the United States.37
This Part focuses on Utah’s use of the firing squad because Utah has
the longest history with the method. Utah has used the firing squad more
frequently than any other method of execution.38 Despite national and
32. M. WATT ESPY & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1608–
2002: THE ESPY FILE 1, at 2 (2002); John D. Bessler, Capital Punishment Law and Practices:
History, Trends, and Developments, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19,
19 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014).
33. See BANNER, supra note 2, at 275; Cutler, supra note 24, at 357. See generally NORMAN
MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER’S SONG (Grand Central Pub. ed. 2012) (1979) (describing the events
related to Gary Gilmore’s execution by firing squad).
34. See Cutler, supra note 24, at 400; Denno, supra note 12, at 790; Klein, supra note 6, at
932.
35. See John Gregory Jacobsen, The Death Penalty in the Great Plains, in INVITATION TO
AN EXECUTION: A HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 243, 254–57 (Gordon
Morris Bakken ed., 2010) (discussing firing squad executions in Kansas and Oklahoma); see also
id. at 257 (discussing the history of capital punishment in Texas); Mary Marki & Christopher
Clayton Smith, Vigilantism During the Gold Rush, in INVITATION TO AN EXECUTION: A HISTORY
OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 403, 405–06 (noting that a group of
outlaws in California was executed in 1848 by a “military auxiliary team” made up of “ten U.S.
soldiers”).
36. See Jacobsen, supra note 35, at 257 (identifying three men shot for desertion during the
Civil War); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PROCEDURE FOR MILITARY EXECUTIONS, Pamphlet No. 27-4, at
5–8 (1947) (describing the procedure for “execution by musketry”); GEOFFREY ABBOTT, LORDS
OF THE SCAFFOLD: A HISTORY OF THE EXECUTIONER 162–63 (1991) (describing American military
firing squad procedures); see also DAVID JOHNSON, EXECUTED AT DAWN: BRITISH FIRING SQUADS
ON THE WESTERN FRONT 1914–1918, at 10 (2015) (discussing the use of firing squad in the
executions of British and Commonwealth soldiers for military offenses committed while on active
duty on the Western Front). The firing squad is also a common method of execution
internationally among countries that retain capital punishment. See Cutler, supra note 24, at 405–
06 (discussing the firing squad’s international use). In 2019, Bahrain, Belarus, China, North
Korea, Somalia, and Yemen carried out executions by shooting. Death Sentences and Executions
2019, AMNESTY INT’L GLOB. REP. 10 (2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/
1847/2020/en/ [https://perma.cc/A74F-943Z]; see also Michael Astor et al., Associated Press,
Firing Squad: Which Countries Use Execution Method, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 24, 2015, 8:28
AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2015/03/24/firing-squad-which-countries-use-executionmethod/ [https://perma.cc/V7CR-V4YT] (discussing the international use of firing squads or
capital punishment by shooting).
37. Vey, supra note 24, at 574.
38. See Executions in the U.S. 1608-2002: The Espy File, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 400–
01 (2019), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/documents/ESPYstate.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BK86-V5CJ]; see also Denno, supra note 12, at 781 (describing Utah’s firing squad executions
as the “most widely used and documented in the country”). Ron Lafferty, who had selected the
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regional changes in execution processes, Utah has adhered to historic
practices, relying on law enforcement officers as executioners even after
it centralized its death row.39 In 2004, Utah eliminated a defendant’s right
to choose between lethal injection and the firing squad, but a 2015
amendment reauthorized the penalty if lethal injection was unavailable or
held unconstitutional.40 A defendant who selected the firing squad before
2004 may still be executed by that method.41 This Article uses Utah’s
practices as a case study in the use of the firing squad, and its continued
retention reflects community preference for localization in capital
punishment, a belief in the deterrent value of the firing squad, and strong
retributive and expressive justifications. Recent developments in South
Carolina, however, merit inclusion in this discussion. The legislative
record of that state’s decision to adopt the firing squad offers an
opportunity to evaluate why a state that had never used that method might
decide to adopt it.
Section I.A surveys Utah’s historic and current use of firing squads
and the role law enforcement officers played in carrying out the penalty.
Section I.B describes the legislative history associated with Utah’s
continued use of the firing squad and the justifications for punishment the
Utah legislature identified in reauthorizing the firing squad. It compares
Utah’s process against South Carolina’s and identifies areas of similarity
and divergence.
A. Utah’s Firing Squads
The first criminal code adopted in what would become the state of
Utah provided for capital punishment and identified the available
methods of execution as shooting, hanging, or beheading.42 Upon
firing squad as a method of execution, died at age seventy-eight in November 2019 of natural
causes. Pamela Manson & Jessica Miller, Utah Death Row Inmate Ron Lafferty Dies of Natural
Causes, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 11, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/11/
11/utah-death-row-inmate-ron/ [perma.cc/C9V7-XEXV].
39. Denno, supra note 12, at 782.
40. See infra Section I.B.
41. See UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 4, at 1.
42. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 132 (1878); Gardner, supra note 31, at 450–51.
Gardner links the use of firing squads to the concept of “blood atonement,” a rejected doctrine of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Gardner, supra note 31, at 448. Blood atonement
“posits that some sins, primarily murder, are so heinous that the atoning sacrifice of Christ is
unavailing as an expiation of the sin of the offender.” Id. at 442. Gardner traces the relationship
between statements from early leaders of the Church and the development of the firing squad as
a method of capital punishment in Utah. See id. at 443–48. The Church issued a public statement
shortly before Ronnie Lee Gardner’s execution acknowledging a nineteenth century history of
“strong language that included notions of people making restitution for their sins by giving up
their own lives.” Mormon Church Statement on Blood Atonement, DESERET NEWS (June 18, 2010,
12:00 PM), https://www.deseret.com/2010/6/18/20122138/mormon-church-statement-on-blood-
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receiving territorial status, Utah adopted the same penalties, with
additional language indicating that either the court or the convicted
person may select the penalty.43 Although Utah’s adoption of a “more
complete criminal code” in 1876 did not specify a mode of execution,
“the Utah courts continued to impose capital punishment by firing
squad.”44
Utah’s first official firing squad execution took place in 1861, before
it became a state.45 In total, Utah executed eleven men before statehood,
eight of them by firing squad.46 Between 1861 and 1972, Utah executed
thirty men by firing squad.47 In 1878, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of the firing squad in Wilkerson v. Utah.48 Wilkerson
had been sentenced to be “publicly shot until [he was] dead.”49 Wilkerson
appealed, arguing that his sentence was unlawful because Utah’s capital
punishment statute did not specify a method of execution.50 Because a
territory has “legislative power which extends to all rightful subjects of
legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution,”51 the Court considered
whether death by firing squad violated the Eighth Amendment.52
Wilkerson distinguished the firing squad from execution methods in
which “other circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace were sometimes
superadded.”53 These “superadded” punishments included being “drawn
or dragged to the place of execution,” being “embowelled alive,
beheaded, and quartered,” being “public[ly] dissect[ed],” and being
“burn[ed] alive.”54 The Court concluded that the method was

atonement [https://perma.cc/ATD3-F5KL]. The Church asserted that “so-called ‘blood
atonement,’ by which individuals would be required to shed their own blood to pay for their sins,
is not a doctrine of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.” Id.
43. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 132; Gardner, supra note 31, at 451.
44. Gardner, supra note 31, at 451.
45. See GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 39; Cutler, supra note 24, at 342.
46. Cutler, supra note 24, at 342–43 & n.31.
47. Id. at 348 & n.65.
48. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
49. Id. at 131.
50. Id. at 131, 136; James R. Acker & Ryan Champagne, The Execution of Wallace
Wilkerson: Precedent and Portent, 42 CRIM. JUST. REV. 349, 351–52 (2017). The Court held that
the territorial statute imposed the responsibility upon the sentencing court to select the mode of
execution. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 137.
51. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 133.
52. Id. at 133–35.
53. Id. at 135. Despite the Court’s confident pronouncement, the firing squad missed
Wilkerson’s heart and he bled to death between approximately fifteen to twenty-seven minutes
while the executioners considered whether it would be necessary to shoot him again. See Acker
& Champagne, supra note 50, at 354 (claiming twenty-seven minutes); GILLESPIE, supra note 2,
at 49 (claiming fifteen minutes).
54. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135.
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constitutional because of its consistent use by the military,55 and because
it was not a “punishment[] of torture.”56
Firing squad executions during Utah’s territorial period and early
statehood were, as in other areas of the United States, localized affairs
that happened a short time after sentencing.57 The local sheriff was
responsible for conducting the execution and locating executioners, often
utilizing his deputies for the firing squad.58 Executions took place in the
locale where the crime had been committed, rather than at a centralized
site.59 Localized capital punishment offered expressive, deterrent, and
retributive messages. For example, John D. Lee, sentenced to death for
his role in the Mountain Meadows Massacre,60 was brought to Mountain
Meadows in 1877 and executed by firing squad while sitting on top of his
own coffin.61 When Patrick Coughlin was executed by firing squad in
1896, one of the rifles used to kill him was the rifle Coughlin had used to
kill one of his victims.62 In addition to overt symbolism, localized
executions meant local control over crime and punishment, and reflected
community condemnation.63
In the 1900s, firing squad executions switched from local executions
to the yard at Sugarhouse Prison.64 This move was consistent with the

55. Id. at 134–35 (observing that the military “authorities” the Court discussed “are quite
sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for
the crime of murder in the first degree is not” cruel and unusual).
56. Id. at 135–36 (“Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of
the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution.”).
57. See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 28, 39–43 (discussing the executions of William
Cockroft, Jason Luce, Robert Sutton, and Chauncey Millard).
58. See, e.g., id. at 21, 42; Cutler, supra note 24, at 343.
59. See Cutler, supra note 24, at 343.
60. See GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 44. See generally JUANITA BROOKS, THE MOUNTAIN
MEADOWS MASSACRE (1950) (describing the events surrounding the Mountain Meadows
Massacre and the Mormon church’s involvement in it).
61. GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 44–47.
62. Id. at 60.
63. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE
OF ABOLITION 122–23 (2010).
64. See GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 65 (describing the location site at Sugarhouse Prison);
Cutler, supra note 24, at 353; James B. Hill, History of Utah State Prison 1850–1952, at 141–42
(June 1952) (M.S. thesis, Brigham Young University) (on file with the Brigham Young University
ScholarsArchive) (listing executions taking place at county jails or other locations); Pat Reavy,
Utah Has Interesting History of Executions, DESERET NEWS (June 16, 2010, 10:02 PM),
https://www.deseret.com/2010/6/17/20121932/utah-has-interesting-history-of-executions#garymark-gilmore-was-executed-by-firing-squad-on-jan-17-1977 [https://perma.cc/E6VP-Z7QZ].

2022]

WHEN POLICE VOLUNTEER TO KILL

217

broader shift in the United States away from local, public executions.65
As capital punishment modernized, states abandoned public executions,
centralized death row, and created bureaucratic and administrative
structures to manage killing. In 1951, Utah transferred its prisoners to the
new state prison in Draper, Utah.66 Two men were executed inside the
“Unfinished A Block” at the new prison.67 Others were executed outside
the prison:68
The condemned used to be shot in an open field north of the
prison compound, beside a rough drainage ditch that cuts
across the high desert of the Salt Lake Valley. They were
marched outside the prison’s perimeter of barbed wire fence
and steel guard towers at dawn, placed in a chair in front of
the canal bank, and shot at a command to the riflemen hidden
from view inside a temporary burlap enclosure that
somewhat resembled a duck blind.69
While Utah centralized executions, it did not change its executioners.
According to Professor L. Kay Gillespie, early firing squads were usually
made up of “volunteers from the sheriff’s office in the county where the
65. See JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 40–72
(1997) (surveying the development of private execution laws and the end of public executions);
BANNER, supra note 2, at 151–66 (discussing the transition from public hangings to jail yard
hangings); CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 12–13 (2016) (same); see also BANNER, supra note 2, at 155, 193–94
(discussing the way changes in methods of execution ended public executions and centralized
execution sites).
66. See History, UTAH DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, https://corrections.utah.gov/history/
[https://perma.cc/XB3B-AUVP]; Hill, supra note 64, at 144 (listing the executions of Eliseo
Mares and Ray Gardner).
67. Hill, supra note 64, at 144. Clark Lobb, Killer Mares Falls to Firing Squad for 1945
Murder of Ohio Sailor, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 11, 1951), https://www.newspapers.com/image/
598740793/?terms=clark%20lobb%20killer%20mares%20falls%20to%20firing%20squad&mat
ch=1 [https://perma.cc/ XN8R-K5YC].
68. See GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 151 (explaining that Gilmore’s execution was “the first
indoor execution in Utah since 1951”); Firing Squad Executes Killer at Utah Prison, MERIDEN
REC. (Mar. 31, 1960), https://www.newspapers.com/image/677769099/?terms=Firing%20Squad
%20Executes%20Killer%20At%20Utah%20Prison&match=1 [https://perma.cc/MC82-AKLY];
Two Executed by Firing Squad for Utah Slaying, DESERT SUN (May 11, 1956),
https://www.newspapers.com/image/747264024/?terms=two%20executed%20by%20firing%20
squad%20for%20utah%20slaying&match=1 [https://perma.cc/R894-2XR2] (“Braasch and
Sullivan died seated in spotlighted chairs in a shed in the outer yard of Utah’s Point of the
Mountain Prison.”).
69. Jon Nordheimer, 2 Dozen Ask to Join Firing Squad; Warden Tells of Utah Volunteers,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/11/archives/2-dozen-ask-to-joinfiring-squad-warden-tells-of-utah-volunteers.html [https://perma.cc/DC4V-VYUL]; see also
Firing Squad Executes Killer at Utah Prison, supra note 68 (“A canvass enclosure hid the firing
squad 20 feet away [from James Rodgers]. Its rifles were poked through slots.”).
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crime occurred.”70 Like other executioners, these volunteers, most
probably law enforcement officers, were anonymous.71 Even after
localized executions ended, the sheriff from the area where the crime was
committed supervised the executions at Sugarhouse and Draper. 72 For
example, the Sheriff of Salt Lake County supervised the 1955 execution
of Don Jesse Neal, who was convicted of killing a Salt Lake City police
officer.73
Beginning in the 1960s, Utah put the prison warden in charge of
organizing and supervising executions instead of a sheriff.74 Wardens
defaulted to the sheriff’s procedure, drawing on local law enforcement
officers to serve as executioners.75 More recent firing squad executions
in 1996 and 2010 have followed the same trend.
Under Utah’s current procedures, the Executive Director of the
Department of Corrections selects “a five-person firing squad of peace
officers.”76 Law enforcement officers from the jurisdiction where the
crime took place must volunteer, and those officers have priority in the
selection process.77 The Department has never had a shortage of

70. GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 21.
71. See id. at 42 (firing squad shot from inside a tent); id. at 65 (firing squad fired from
behind a curtain at Sugarhouse prison); Cutler, supra note 24, at 357 n.121 (“[N]o prison officer
has ever served on a firing squad in Utah.”).
72. See GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 139 (noting that the Sheriff of Iron County, where the
trial was held, supervised the double execution of Verne Braasch and Melvin Sullivan); Firing
Squad Executes Killer at Utah Prison, supra note 68 (stating that San Juan County Sheriff Seth
Wright supervised the execution of James Rodgers); Nordheimer, supra note 69; see also Peter
Gillins, 7 Men on Death Row at Utah State Prison; High Court Holds Fate, THE DAILY HERALD
(APR. 29, 1976) (on file with author) (“Before the Supreme Court outlawed the death
penalty . . . Utah law required the sheriff in a county where a murder was committed to act as
executioner.”).
73. Convicted Slayer Shot, READING EAGLE (July 1, 1955), https://news.google.com/
newspapers?nid=1955&dat=19550701&id=SQ0rAAAAIBAJ&sjid=X5oFAAAAIBAJ&pg=615
4,8242 [https://perma.cc/K7JS-WHCT]. The article identifies the executioners as “private citizens
who volunteered” but does not indicate if they were also law enforcement officers. Id.
74. George A. Sorenson, Warden Carries Burden of Duty, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 11, 1976)
(noting that in 1961, the Utah legislature put the prison warden in charge of executions, rather
than the local sheriff).
75. Gillins, supra note 72 (“If I ever have to do it, I suppose I’ll follow the procedure used
by the county sheriffs. They picked volunteers from people they knew. A lot of law enforcement
people usually served.” (quoting Warden Sam Smith)).
76. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(3) (LexisNexis 2021); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-1074(3) (LexisNexis 2021); UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 22, at 53–54.
77. See McCombs, supra note 23; Robert Kirby, ’96 Firing Squad Shares Motives, Roles,
SEATTLE TIMES (June 17, 2010, 8:09 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/96-firingsquad-shares-motives-roles/ [https://perma.cc/BK4C-BDS2]; infra note 112 and accompanying
text (discussing the process of locating executioners).
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volunteers.78 Executioners may also be recruited. In an interview with
three members of the firing squad who executed John Albert Taylor in
1996, the executioners explained that their “police agency designated an
officer to select the other four.”79 Others volunteered: the police officers
who executed Ronnie Lee Gardner volunteered and then were “selected
by lottery.”80
Executions take place at the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah.81 The
“Tie-Down Team” removes the prisoner from the observation cell and
escorts him to the execution chamber.82 The team straps the prisoner into
a metal chair.83 After the prisoner’s last words, a black hood is placed
over his head.84 A target is placed over the prisoner’s heart.85 The
executioners wait in an adjoining room with slits in the walls allowing
them to fire through into the execution chamber.86 Once all is ready, the
team leader “begin[s] the cadence for the executioners to fire.”87 If the
prisoner remains alive after the first volley, the execution protocols direct
that the executioners must fire a second volley.88 The process is swift and
final.89 The anonymous officers leave the prison and return to their lives
and duties as police officers.
78. See McCombs, supra note 23; Joseph P. Williams, The Return of the Firing Squad, US
NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2017-03-03/
the-firing-squad-is-making-a-comeback-in-death-penalty-cases [https://perma.cc/ZPK8-359T];
Nordheimer, supra note 69; Kirby, supra note 77.
79. Kirby, supra note 77.
80. Id.; see also Ashley Hayes, Executioner: Death by Firing Squad Is “100 Percent
Justice,” CNN (June 10, 2010, 6:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/06/09/utah.
firing.squad/index.html [https://perma.cc/4E7D-695X] (interviewing an officer who volunteered
for the firing squad that executed John Albert Taylor).
81. Nordheimer, supra note 69.
82. UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 22, at 34.
83. See id. at 75; Cutler, supra note 24, at 364; Denno, supra note 12, at 783; Vey, supra
note 24, at 574; MAILER, supra note 33, at 1011–12; Carlisle, supra note 5; McCombs, supra note
23; Trent Nelson, Photograph of the Firing Squad Execution Chamber at the Utah State Prison in
Draper, Utah in June 2010, in Utah Brings Back Firing Squad Executions; Witnesses Recall the
Last One, NPR (Apr. 5, 2015, 7:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/05/397672199/utahbrings-back-firing-squad-executions-witnesses-recall-the-last-one [https://perma.cc/2NZ2-9LD6].
84. Carlisle, supra note 5.
85. UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 22, at 89; Cutler, supra note 24, at 364; Denno, supra
note 12, at 783 n.244; Vey, supra note 24, at 574.
86. See UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 22, at 89; see also MAILER, supra note 33, at
1011; Carlisle, supra note 5.
87. UTAH DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 22, at 89.
88. Id. at 90–91.
89. Denno, supra note 12, at 753. Two firing squad executions in Utah have been botched
because the executioners missed the prisoner’s heart. The first was Wallace Wilkerson’s
execution. See supra note 53. The other was the 1951 execution of Eliseo Mares. See GILLESPIE,
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The relationship between the role of executioner and the role of law
enforcement officer is a complicated one. Executions are a form of
outside employment—executioners receive additional compensation
from the Department of Corrections.90 Yet, because being a peace officer
is a necessary qualification to serve as an executioner, and because there
are significant areas of overlap between the violence of executions and
the violence associated with policing, there is a substantial relationship
between the two.91 Officers have also drawn linkages between the
mission of policing and community protection to the decision to volunteer
to take a life.92
Former executioners who have spoken anonymously about their role
in firing squad executions link that decision to their responsibilities as
police officers. As one police officer who volunteered93 to execute Gary
Gilmore explained in a statement to The New York Times: “Somebody’s
got to do it . . . and we’ve got the guts to put our lives on the line every
day, so why not us?”94 Representative Paul Ray, who reintroduced the
use of firing squads in Utah in 2015, explained that volunteers “kind of
see it as their civic duty . . . to help carry these out.”95
Disentangling the relationship between community protection
functions and a decision to volunteer to kill offers an opportunity to
evaluate the way in which the firing squad serves the justifications of
punishment and the relationship between punishment and community
values.96 The decision to retain the firing squad and traditional execution
practices in the face of significant changes to punishment and capital
punishment demonstrates the significance of localized punishment
preferences. Punishment serves many goals, but the specificity and the
ritual surrounding firing squad executions as Utah has performed them
reveals strong preference for localized punishment and the importance of
supra note 2, at 129 (noting when a firing squad missed, and it took a second volley to kill him);
Clark Lobb, A Recollection of Dawn and Death of Men, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 1976) (from L.
Kay Gillespie Archives, Weber State University) (on file with author).
90. Executioners are paid separately for the task. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(4)
(LexisNexis 2021) (“Compensation for persons administering intravenous injections and for
members of a firing squad . . . shall be in an amount determined by the director of the Division of
Finance.”).
91. See infra Part II.
92. See, e.g., Nordheimer, supra note 69.
93. It is unknown if he was chosen.
94. Nordheimer, supra note 69.
95. More Perfect: Cruel and Unusual, RADIOLAB, at 32:54–33:08 (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/radiolab-more-perfect-cruel-and-unusual
[https://perma.cc/BYW7-483P].
96. Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 23 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (analyzing methods of punishment “as
techniques possessing their own specificity in the more general field of other ways of exercising
power”).

2022]

WHEN POLICE VOLUNTEER TO KILL

221

the retributive and expressive values of those methods.97 Utah’s
legislative proceedings addressing the firing squad address these values.
By contrast, South Carolina’s decision to adopt the firing squad focused
less on localized punishment and messages in a particular method of
execution and more on the generalized functions of capital punishment.
B. Legislative Decisions, Justifying Punishment, and the Firing Squad
The firing squad is overt violence, rather than mechanized or pseudomedical acts that mask the violence of killing. It bears a greater
resemblance to the sort of violence it punishes.98 Retaining the firing
squad as well as its specific procedures—even throughout Utah’s process
of centralization—may be attributable to history or convenience. It also
reflects the localized nature of capital punishment, albeit at a different
level than typical community decisionmaking about the death penalty.99
It puts the responsibility for killing directly in the hands of the
community.100 These themes were present during legislative debates in
2004, when Utah eliminated the firing squad as a method of execution,
and in 2015, when the state reauthorized it as a backup method.
In 2004, Utah eliminated a defendant’s ability to choose between
lethal injection and the firing squad as a method of execution, and set
lethal injection as the default method of execution.101 The bill’s sponsor,
Representative Sheryl Allen, emphasized that firing squad executions
received significant negative international attention—something that the
victims of the crime, or the heinousness of the crime, did not receive.102
Opposition to the bill focused on the expressive, retributive, and
deterrent features of the firing squad. One representative argued against
the bill because minimizing scrutiny and trying to “sanitize” the penalty
failed to serve penological goals: “[I]f it’s something that we believe in,
then we need to let people know that this is what you do.”103 A state
97. Cf. Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 940 (2016)
(“Criminal justice is culture-bearing. It is the site at which cultures negotiate certain kinds of
issues connected to wrongdoing and community, social order and violence, identity, the power of
the state, and the terms of collective ethical life.”).
98. Cf. AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
CONDITION 65 (2001) (“[T]he legal construction of state killing, while it appears to reveal empathy
or identification between the state and those it kills, works primarily to differentiate state killing
from murder.”).
99. See GARLAND, supra note 63, at 35 (explaining that capital punishment “continues to
be driven by local politics and populist politicians”).
100. See Hearing on H.B. 11: Death Penalty Procedure Amendments, 61st Leg., 2015 Gen.
Sess., at 39:08–39:48 (Utah Feb. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Utah House Hearing] (statement of Rep.
Paul Ray), https://le.utah.gov/av/floorArchive.jsp?markerID=90707.
101. See H.B. 180, 55th Leg., 2004 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004).
102. H.B. 180, 55th Leg., 2004 Gen. Sess., at 32:50–33:32 (Utah Jan. 26, 2004) (statement
of Rep. Sheryl Allen), https://le.utah.gov/av/floorArchive.jsp?markerID=3537.
103. Id. at 54:30–55:26 (statement of Rep. Gregory Hughes).
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senator contended that the “media circus” was “exactly what we want”
because it served deterrent values: “We want them to know that there are
punishments that are severe punishments, if you come to the state of Utah
and do these kinds of things.”104 He also argued that, because lethal
injection was (purportedly) painless, it offered an “easy way out” to
individuals who had committed “gruesome and horrible crimes,” and
proposed giving the power to choose the method of execution to the jury
or the victim’s family.105 From this perspective, death alone was
insufficient, and it was more appropriate to allow the method of death to
speak for the legislature—and for the victim.
In 2015, in response to the lethal injection litigation that culminated
in Glossip v. Gross,106 Representative Paul Ray sponsored H.B. 11, which
reauthorized the firing squad as a backup option in the event that lethal
injection drugs were unavailable or ruled unconstitutional.107 The ensuing
debates included discussions of the brutality and violence of the firing
squad,108 and statistics about the limited or nonexistent deterrent value of
the death penalty.109 Representative Ray emphasized the possibility of
avoiding expensive legal battles over lethal injection and that dying by
firing squad was a “quick bleed out” as compared to lethal injection,
which was “a lot slower; more painful . . . than a firing squad.”110
One representative raised the potential for psychological trauma to the
executioners based on his assumption that corrections officers would
conduct the executions.111 Representative Ray clarified that correctional
employees do not participate:
Understand in a firing squad, it’s not the correctional
employees that are the firing squad. Let’s say for instance, a
shooting took place in my district in Clinton, the Clinton
Police Department would have the first option to volunteer
for the firing squad. And then they would kinda go out to
104. See Hearing on H.B. 180: Death Penalty Provisions, 55th Leg., 2004 Gen. Sess., at
1:04:00–1:04:44 (Utah Feb. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Utah Senate Hearing] (statement of Sen. David
Thomas), https://le.utah.gov/av/floorArchive.jsp?markerID=33616 (“One of the primary
purposes of the death penalty is deterrence.”).
105. Id. at 1:05:10–1:05:52 (statement of Sen. Thomas).
106. 576 U.S. 863 (2015).
107. See Utah House Hearing, supra note 100, at 24:17–26:03 (statement of Rep. Ray);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-113(3)–(4) (LexisNexis 2021). Like its predecessor, the 2004 bill, H.B.
11 preserves the method of execution for prisoners who chose the firing squad before the 2004
bill was enacted. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-113(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2021).
108. Utah House Hearing, supra note 100, at 28:39–30:00 (statement of Rep. Brian King)
(describing in detail how the state conducts firing squad executions); id. at 32:45–33:02
(observing that the perception of the firing squad is that it is “barbaric”).
109. Id. at 32:08–32:40 (discussing deterrence).
110. Id. at 38:06–39:08 (statement of Rep. Ray).
111. Id. at 30:04–30:19 (statement of Rep. King) (describing the “attendant psychological
trauma” from participating in a “cold-blooded execution”).
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like the county, neighboring jurisdictions. Nobody’s forced
to be on a firing squad. It is done upon a volunteer basis and
we’ve never not had enough volunteers to do that. So,
nobody’s ever forced or asked to be on it against their will.112
Subsequent legislative proceedings did not address whether police
should conduct the execution, the impact of drawing executioners from
the locality where the crime took place, or the potential consequences.
When legislators did consider executioners, their focus was on possible
trauma—or the lack thereof. While this is consistent with legislatures’
preference to delegate execution details,113 it is still surprising given the
enormity of the policy choice and the legislative emphasis on the
justifications and messages associated with lethal injection. Similar
patterns are present in South Carolina’s recent change to its methods of
execution.
South Carolina had never formally adopted the firing squad as a
method of execution before 2021.114 Its decision was, unlike Utah’s,
driven by immediate necessity. South Carolina ran out of lethal injection
drugs in 2013.115 Before the amendment, South Carolina’s method of
execution statute provided a choice between lethal injection and
electrocution, with lethal injection as the default method if the
condemned did not choose.116 Like Utah’s legislators, South Carolina’s
legislators focused on the ability to carry out executions and the potential
to avoid constitutional litigation (although they recognized that litigation
was inevitable).117 Legislators emphasized that if the state did not change
its method of execution statute, it would be unable to carry out
executions—and that three men whose appeals had been exhausted were
waiting on death row.118 The 2021 amendment offered condemned people
112. Id. at 39:15–39:45 (statement of Rep. Ray).
113. See generally Klein, supra note 6 (describing the broad discretion given to state
executive agencies regarding execution details through the lens of the nondelegation doctrine).
114. See Hearing on S.B. 200 Before the South Carolina Senate, 124th Leg., 2021–2022
Gen. Sess., at 1:10:00-1:11:02 (S.C. Mar. 2, 2021) [hereinafter South Carolina Senate Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Greg Hembree), https://www.scstatehouse.gov/video/archives.php (discussing
the history of the death penalty in South Carolina).
115. See Michelle Liu, SC Delays Executions, Citing Lack of Lethal Injection Drugs,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 30, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/south-carolina-courts-executions931bae9dd612fe341f3c09b0bcd8ff91 [https://perma.cc/NJH5-FKR9].
116. See South Carolina Senate Hearing, supra note 114, at 1:10:00-1:11:02 (statement of
Sen. Hembree) (discussing the history of the death penalty in South Carolina).
117. See id. at 1:11:55–1:12:46 (discussing the constitutionality of firing squad executions);
id. at 1:15:27–1:16:43 (discussing the constitutionality of firing squad executions and the
likelihood that they would be challenged in court).
118. Id. at 1:09:33–1:10:07 (discussing delays in carrying out executions); Hearing on S.B.
200 Before the South Carolina House of Representatives, 124th Leg., 2021–2022 Gen. Sess., at
1:10:40–1:11:09 (S.C. May 5, 2021) [hereinafter South Carolina House Hearing],
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a choice of the electric chair, lethal injection (if the drugs are available),
or the firing squad.119 Changing the default and adding another method
meant that executions could go forward, even without lethal injection
drugs.
As in the Utah reauthorization, the sponsors of the South Carolina law
emphasized that the firing squad was more “humane” than the electric
chair.120 But legislators addressed the punitive justifications for capital
punishment, rather than a specific method. Some legislators who favored
the amendment also appeared more comfortable acknowledging the
relationship between vengeance and capital punishment. One sponsor
agreed there was “no question” that capital punishment was a form of
vengeance.121 Another representative who supported the bill offered both
retributive and vengeful justifications—he asserted that death was
appropriate for people who have killed, and the government’s role is not
to prevent crime, but avenge it.122 Others critiqued a public desire for
vengeance,123 emphasizing incapacitation over other justifications.124
South Carolina’s legislators were similarly uninformed about who
might carry out executions, although the bill’s sponsors suggested that

https://www.scstatehouse.gov/video/archives.php (explaining that three people on death row have
exhausted their appeals but cannot be executed).
119. See Victoria Hansen, Death Row Inmates Sue After They're Asked to Pick Firing Squad
or Electric Chair, NPR (May 20, 2021, 2:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/05/20/998600135
/south-carolina-reinstates-firing-squad-but-not-without-legal-challenges [https://perma.cc/74BDQD9P]. The amendment also changed the default method to the electric chair. See id.
120. South Carolina Senate Hearing, supra note 114, at 1:16:43–1:17:35 (statement of Sen.
Hembree) (explaining that the firing squad may be more “humane” than the electric chair); id. at
1:57:15–1:57:46 (statement of Sen. Penny Gustafson) (emphasizing the need for a humane and
quick method of execution); id. at 2:05:46–2:07:32 (statement of Sen. Dick Harpootlian)
(explaining that hanging is not humane, that the electric chair produces agony, and that the firing
squad is less painful); see also Jamie Lovegrove, Why a Democrat Pushed for Firing Squad to Be
Added to SC Death Penalty Bill, POST & COURIER (May 7, 2021), https://www.postandcourier
.com/politics/why-a-democrat-pushed-for-firing-squad-to-be-added-to-sc-death-penalty-bill/
article_bac5e5f6-af3d-11eb-9eee-17c6341208cb.html [https://perma.cc/BB6S-VFTV] (“‘There’s
instance after instance after instance where people are not dead after the first jolt, they’re
screaming and on fire,’ Harpootlian said. ‘Horrible, horrible thing to do to another human
being.’”).
121. South Carolina Senate Hearing, supra note 114, at 1:19:08–1:19:20 (statement of Sen.
Hembree) (responding to a question about whether the death penalty involves vengeance).
122. See South Carolina House Hearing, supra note 118, at 5:27:52–5:29:20 (statement of
Rep. Josiah Magnusen) (explaining that the purpose of “civil government” is to responsibly wield
force and provide justice).
123. See South Carolina Senate Hearing, supra note 114, at 2:04:56–2:05:08 (statement of
Sen. Harpootlian) (condemning the public for gathering outside a penitentiary to cheer for the
execution of a death row inmate).
124. See id. at 2:03:22–2:04:30 (explaining that execution was the only way to incapacitate
an individual who would predictably continue to murder).
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Utah’s protocol might serve as a model.125 Representatives expressed
concern about involvement in executions from “agencies” outside the
Department of Corrections.126 Although it is no secret that Utah’s
executioners are law enforcement officers, one sponsor explained that he
thought Utah’s executioners were from the state’s Department of
Corrections.127 South Carolina’s Supreme Court stayed the pending
executions of Brad Sigmon and Freddie Owens until the Department of
Corrections could develop a protocol for the firing squad so Sigmon and
Owens could exercise their statutorily granted choice between
electrocution and the firing squad.128 South Carolina’s Department of
Corrections developed its protocol by “looking to other states for
guidance.”129
Although both legislatures cited humanitarian impulses, by retaining
or adopting the firing squad, the legislatures opened an avenue of
violence that did not exist before, while using a form of punishment that
draws upon justifications that conflict with the Eighth Amendment’s role
of blocking baser, more vengeful impulses.130 Adopting the firing squad,
while ostensibly intended to ensure that executions can continue despite
drug shortages and lethal injection litigation, also carries important
expressive and retributive messages. As Professor Joshua Kleinfeld has
argued, the decline in executions in the United States means that capital
punishment holds even greater significance as a “cultural symbol.”131
Policing—and police killing—also carries significance as a cultural
symbol. And surprisingly, one South Carolina representative centered
police violence in his remarks in opposition to the adoption of the firing
125. South Carolina House Hearing, supra note 118, at 1:12:49–1:14:08 (discussion
between Reps. Weston Newton and Robert Williams about who would carry out the execution
and whether an outside entity would be involved).
126. See id. at 1:12:52–1:14:08; id. at 1:15:22–1:15:40 (statement of Rep. Newton
responding to questions about who would carry out the execution).
127. South Carolina Senate Hearing, supra note 114, at 2:06:50–2:07:07 (statement of Sen.
Harpootlian) (discussing Utah’s firing squad procedure and the “marksmen” the Department of
Corrections uses as executioners).
128. State v. Sigmon, Nos. 2002-024388 & 2021-000584 (S.C. June 16, 2021),
https://documents.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Sigmon-Stay-Order-SC-2021-06-16.pdf [https://perma
.cc/RL4K-PS6E]; State v. Owens, No. 2006-038802 (S.C. June 16, 2021), https://documents.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/Owens-Stay-Order-SC-2021-06-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRU3-C3MG].
129. Michelle Liu & Meg Kinnard, 2 South Carolina Executions Halted Until Firing Squad
Formed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 16, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/south-carolinaexecutions-government-and-politics-eb4c65a31c298c87063dd3445dbcd43c [https://perma.cc/
W9SC-JAVP]; see Herrington, supra note 20.
130. See GARLAND, supra note 63, at 247–48 (describing legislators’ modern arguments for
public, local executions).
131. Kleinfeld, supra note 97, at 987 (“Capital punishment says something about where a
culture stands on matters of violence, evil, wrongdoing, and rights—something we feel intuitively
but that is extremely difficult to identify and articulate.”).
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squad. In response to a statement by another representative that South
Carolina, which had not carried out an execution in a decade, had a de
facto moratorium,132 Representative Chris Hart argued that the state had
carried out executions through police killings.133 He asserted that Walter
Scott had been executed by the “hands of this government,” and, unlike
the men on death row, Scott did not receive a choice of how he was to
die.134 Representative Hart drew parallels between capital punishment
and police violence, arguing that Black residents of South Carolina
deserved a choice not to be executed by the police for accusations or
minor infractions.135 Perhaps in recognition of this issue, South Carolina
elected not to rely on police as executioners; instead, their firing squad
executioners will be three employees from the South Carolina
Department of Corrections who volunteer to carry out executions.136
South Carolina’s decision, however, does not mean that other states will
not follow the same practice as Utah.
Using police officers as executioners underscores the complex
tensions inherent in government decisions to kill at any level. The
normative, aspirational functions of policing are inconsistent with serving
as executioners. Yet, the role of executioner is consistent with the cultural
problems and powers of policing that are associated with discretionary,
and sometimes punitive, police violence.
II. THE PUNISHERS
Evaluating methods of execution sometimes requires assessing
executioners. Capital punishment scholarship has, for example, explored
physicians’ participation in lethal injection executions.137 Police
132. South Carolina House Hearing, supra note 118, at 1:18:40–1:19:04 (statement of Rep.
Jonathon Hill).
133. Id. at 1:20:16–1:20:40 (statement of Rep. Chris Hart).
134. Id. at 1:20:43–1:21:01. In 2015, Officer Michael Slager of the North Charleston Police
Department shot and killed Walter Scott. See Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina
Officer Is Charged with Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes
.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html
[https://perma.cc/Z7ZT-PNCS]. Slager stopped Scott for driving with a broken taillight. Id. When
Scott fled on foot, Slager chased him, fired his Taser at Scott, and then fired eight shots at Scott
as he fled. Id. Scott was unarmed. Id. Slager was sentenced to twenty years in federal prison for
violating Scott’s civil rights. Jamiel Lynch & Jason Hanna, A Judge Declined to Toss the Federal
Sentence of Ex-Officer Michael Slager in Fatal Walter Scott Shooting, CNN (Apr. 20, 2021, 10:17
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/us/michael-slager-walter-scott-sentence/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6W97-A7CP].
135. South Carolina House Hearing, supra note 118, 1:21:05–1:22:20 (statement of Rep.
Hart); id. at 1:24:11–1:24:59.
136. Press Release, South Carolina Dep’t of Corr., (March 18, 2022) (on file with author).
137. See TIMOTHY V. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, FROM NOOSE TO NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND THE LATE LIBERAL STATE 199 (2002) (discussing the medical profession’s resistance to
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participation in executions deserves similar scrutiny. Like physicians,
police officers have a distinct professional identity. Police officers are a
part of a community’s immediate response system of investigation and
response, rather than the formal punishment apparatus. Yet police—and
punishment—are part of the criminal legal system as a whole. Unlike
physicians, however, police officers who have performed executions
have described the activity as routine, even indistinguishable, from their
policing function.138
Police killings in the line of duty and executions “are the two most
prominent types of deliberative killings by agencies of government in the
United States.”139 Professor Franklin Zimring asserts that executions and
police killings are “polar opposite[s].”140 But this Article argues that they
are related, both because of the broad discretion in execution decisions
and police violence, and because firing squad executions rely on police
officers as volunteer executioners.
Assessing the tensions and contradictions in this role offers an
opportunity to reevaluate the relationship between policing and
punishment. The “community caretaking” component of police
participation in firing squads is consistent with negative aspects of
policing culture. Section II.A draws upon scholarship exploring police
violence and policing as punishment. It asserts that, despite legal
frameworks for police violence that tolerate police punishment, police are
not supposed to punish. Section II.B addresses the potential consequences
of allowing police to punish. Using police officers to conduct executions
participation in executions). See generally Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician Participation in
Lethal Injection Executions, 88 N.C. L. REV. 11 (2009) (considering the necessary roles
physicians play in state ordered executions); James K. Boehnlein, Should Physicians Participate
in State-Ordered Executions?, 15 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 240 (2013), https://journalofethics
.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.ama-assn.org/files/2018-05/pfor3-1303.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W4SP-D9K7] (explaining the arguments for and against physician participation in lethal
injections); Deborah W. Denno, Physician Participation in Lethal Injection, 380 N. ENGL. J. MED.
1790 (2019) (discussing the issues surrounding physician participation in lethal injection);
Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death
Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (2007) [hereinafter Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary]
(arguing that, in order for states to avoid the early mistakes surrounding the implementation of
lethal injection as a method of execution, a commission including medical personnel should
consider and create proper injection protocols); Atul Gawande, When Law and Ethics Collide—
Why Physicians Participate in Executions, 354 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1221 (2006) (providing stories
recounted by physicians who participated in state executions and explaining how the physicians
became involved in the practice).
138. See Hayes, supra note 80; Kirby, supra note 77; Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary,
supra note 137, at 69 (quoting one of the developers of the first lethal injection protocol as saying
that participating in a execution “cannot reasonably be construed to be the practice of medicine”
(quoting A. Jay Chapman, Lethal Injections Not Practice of Medicine, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 22–
29, 1991, at 45, 45)).
139. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL 5 (2017).
140. Id. at 120.
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threatens the legitimacy of both policing and punishment because it
invites extrajudicial violence and bad motives, is likely to undermine
community trust, and exacerbates cultural problems of policing.141
A. When Police Punish
Violence is primarily a state monopoly that is most commonly
expressed through policing and punishment.142 Police officers enforce the
law as agents of the executive.143 Policing, at its heart, is the discretionary
ability to enforce the law through violence.144 Arrests, for example, are a
form of violence because they deprive an individual of their liberty. An
arrest may be controlled, state-authorized violence, but it remains a
violent act. Other forms of police violence include the use of force to
apprehend or subdue suspects. Like the violence used to carry out a
criminal or death sentence, the power to police is the power to engage in
violent force—including killing.145

141. See generally Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian
Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611 (2016) [hereinafter Stoughton, Principled Policing]
(explaining how the “Warrior ethos” of policing has caused the overuse of force by police officers
and resulted in low confidence in the institution of policing across the United States); Seth
Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225 (2015) (describing
the problems created by the widespread adoption of Warrior mentality in the police force).
142. See KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 137, at 200; cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
671 (1977) (holding that corporal punishment inflicted by administrators and teachers does not
violate the Eighth Amendment because the students attended public school). But see GARLAND,
supra note 63, at 171 (discussing how America’s failure to “fully succeed[] in its efforts to
monopolize legitimate violence” has “produce[d] America’s high levels of interpersonal violence
and distinctive patterns of violence control”).
143. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1827, 1833 (2015); Brandon Hasbrouck, The Unconstitutional Police, 56 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 239, 248 (2021).
144. See EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 36–37 (1970)
(discussing legitimacy in the use of responsive force); Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police
Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1152 (2008) (“[I]t is the discretionary capacity to
back a state directive with force that constitutes the essence of policing.”); see also Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978) (“Police officers . . . are clothed with authority to exercise an
almost infinite variety of discretionary powers.”).
145. See BITTNER, supra note 144, at 39 (“It makes much more sense to say that the police
are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society.”);
see also ZIMRING, supra note 139, at 17 (“The use of force and therefore the possibility of violence
is more than an occasional by-product of police officers doing their jobs; it is an essential
characteristic of the role of police in a modern social system.”); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 143, at 1831 & n.15 (defining police by their use of surveillance and force); Diarmaid M.
Harkin, The Police and Punishment: Understanding the Pains of Policing, 19 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 43, 48 (2015) (“[T]he police can gain legitimacy from use-of-force, violence and
inflicting types of injury.” (emphasis omitted)); Harmon, supra note 144, at 1121 (discussing
police use of force in relation to state power).
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Legislatures and courts regulate police violence.146 Police receive
substantial discretion in how and when they use violence. Judges
evaluating police use of force emphasize officers’ need to make “splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.”147 This assessment, which combines “state authority
and human agency . . . distinguishes police violence from other forms of
state coercion and from other forms of justified force by individuals.”148
Judicial inquiry into police use of force operates from the perspective of
a “reasonable officer on the scene.”149 Courts do not assess an officer’s
subjective motivations, even if an officer may have used force to punish,
rather than subdue, a suspect.150 The Supreme Court has expressly
acknowledged that some policing may always be violent—and that such
violence may evade scrutiny.151 The quasi-objective police perspective
allows courts to normalize and routinize violence because it often
presumes that violence is a normal police response.152
Police do not carry out the penalties for violating the law. Professor
Rachel Harmon distinguishes police violence from punishment,
explaining that, “[b]ecause police uses of force are both determined and
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). State laws
may also limit the circumstances in which police can use deadly force. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-22(c) (2021); IDAHO CODE § 18-4011 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5227 (2020);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.046.3(2) (West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (2021); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-404 (LexisNexis 2021). See generally Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, Police Use
of Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years After Garner, 35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109 (2015)
(discussing the different standards that states use to regulate police use of force).
147. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
148. Harmon, supra note 144, at 1121.
149. Graham, 490 U.S. at 387 (emphasis added). The standard is quasi-objective because it
relies on police perspectives in assessing the need for violence, rather than a reasonable person’s
perspective or a normative standard that considers the force law enforcement should be allowed
to use in a “free and open society.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (contending that the Court should determine the legitimacy of privacy expectations by
considering the risks an individual should be forced to assume in a free and open society).
150. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397–98 (declining to consider subjective motivations of
individual officers).
151. See id. at 396 (“‘Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of a judge’s chambers,’ violates the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973))); see also Harkin, supra note 145, at 48
(“[P]olice pain-delivery can be placed within a wider sociology of punishment that demonstrates
how police violence is provided with a warranty of approval and encouragement from larger,
aggregate, deeply held emotions and sensibilities.”); RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP:
THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 173 (2014) (discussing how violence is “an
acceptable outcome of drug policing”).
152. Cf. Jelani Jefferson Exum, The Death Penalty on the Streets: What the Eighth
Amendment Can Teach About Regulating Police Use of Force, 80 MO. L. REV. 987, 992 (2015)
(“When the only constitutional standard regulating use of force by police is a reasonableness
standard that is informed by the judgment of police officers, the result is limited justice.”).
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imposed by persons who are under threat, these acts are unlike
punishment, the paradigmatic form of state coercion, which is detached,
impersonal, and institutionally enacted.”153 She observes that this force is
“instrumental,” and there are no “deontological justifications for the
practice of exercising state force against criminal suspects.”154 As police
violence is a poor fit with legitimate goals of punishment, Professor
Harmon reasons that “[t]he state is therefore not justified in empowering
its police officers to use force to achieve the goals of punishment.”155
Professor Didier Fassin observes that, under a “normative” definition of
punishment,156 police should not punish because “their legal authority
does not imply that such would be an appropriate role for them.”157
Courts have generally rejected deontological justifications for police
use of force against suspects. In Tennessee v. Garner,158 Tennessee
argued that police were justified in using deadly force against a fleeing
suspect—regardless of the danger that suspect might present—to
guarantee that offenders did not evade punishment.159 In other words,
provided an officer had probable cause to seize a suspect, the Constitution
did not impose any restraints on how to effect the seizure—doing
otherwise might interfere with the state’s interest in punishing individuals
who violate the law.160 Tennessee’s argument drew on retributive (if

153. Harmon, supra note 144, at 1121.
154. Id. at 1151.
155. Id. at 1152.
156. See H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 4–5 (1st ed. 1968) (defining punishment as involving “pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant,” “for an offence against legal rules,” “of an actual or supposed offender
for his offence,” “intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender,” and
“imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence
is committed”); see also Dan Markel et al., Essay, Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice
Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 619 (2011) (“[S]tate punishment is best and conventionally thought
of as those intended, coercive, condemnatory deprivations inflicted against persons in response
to their crimes and by state officials who are authorized to inflict those deprivations.”).
157. Didier Fassin, The Police Are the Punishment, 31 PUB. CULTURE 539, 545 (2019).
Fassin discusses police violence and police punishment based on his ethnographic research in
Paris, France, but his observations and conclusions are relevant to the problem of police violence
in the United States. See id. at 554–55.
158. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
159. See id. at 9–10 (noting that the State of Tennessee argued that “overall violence will be
reduced by encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects who know that they may be shot if
they flee”); Brief of Petitioners at 15, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (No. 83-1070),
1984 WL 566026 (“It must be recognized that [a felon’s] right to escape, once probable cause to
arrest exists, is not a constitutionally protected interest. There is no constitutional right to commit
felonious offenses and to escape the consequences of those offenses.”).
160. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7.
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disproportionate) rationales: offenders should be punished, and escape
means the offender might evade punishment.161
The Court rejected this argument because of changes to punishment.
The common law authorized any force necessary to apprehend a fleeing
felon, but at that time, as the Court explained, virtually all felonies were
capital offenses.162 Since most felonies are no longer punishable by death,
the state’s interest in punishment did not justify an officer’s use of deadly
force: “These changes have undermined the concept, which was
questionable to begin with, that use of deadly force against a fleeing felon
is merely a speedier execution of someone who has already forfeited his
life.”163 Deadly force, unless absolutely necessary,164 actually frustrated
the important interest in “judicial determination of guilt and
punishment,”165 matters critical to an orderly society.166 Officers, in other
words, do not have the authority to punish.
The reasonableness of police use of force may overlap with
deontological rationales at times. Scott v. Harris167 suggested that calling
off potentially dangerous high-speed pursuits might incentivize fleeing
suspects to behave recklessly to evade police.168 Incapacitation supported
police action because sometimes, the Court reasoned, police may need to
engage in force to prevent a suspect from harming others.169 The
reasonableness inquiry receives support from the generalized
justifications for state violence, although such support is limited.170
Yet police have used their state-granted authority and discretion to
wield physical force that bears striking similarity to punishment. Police
may engage in unofficial, yet sanctioned violence—punishment—against
161. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2000) (“[C]rime
inherently merits punishment.”).
162. Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–13.
163. Id. at 14.
164. See id. at 11–12 (“Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and
if, where feasible, some warning has been given.”).
165. Id. at 9.
166. See id.; Harmon, supra note 144, at 1128.
167. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
168. Id. at 385; Harmon, supra note 144, at 1150.
169. Scott, 550 U.S. at 386 (“A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed
car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”). Garner similarly
signals to incapacitation in describing when deadly force falls within the Fourth Amendment. See
supra note 164.
170. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, while Harris’s flight
“merited severe punishment,” it was “not . . . a capital offense, or even an offense that justified
the use of deadly force”).
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individuals they perceive as suspect, or as having violated some legal rule
or norm, before judicial process takes place.171 Such violence may even
be, as Dean Jelani Jefferson Exum asserts, “the administration of the
death penalty on the streets, absent the procedural protections and focus
on human dignity given in the criminal justice system through the Eighth
Amendment.”172 Other scholars have concluded that police violence can
be punitive, serving retributive and retaliatory functions.173 Professor
Fassin contends that the reality of police violence reveals punitive
motivations, even though such action may not fit within the legal
definition of punishment.174
Police violence as punishment is inconsistent with democratic norms
because it is spontaneous, reactive, and outside the judicial process. Yet,
Professor Fassin points out that the legal and social frameworks around
police violence demonstrate that “society delegates to certain institutions
and professions, notably the police, the dirty work of punishing with the
implicit permission to exceed the moral and legal limits of
punishment.”175 Police violence can be conceptualized as an
unsanctioned form of punishment insofar as it is a response by a state
authority to perceived (or real) transgressions. Police may administer
violence—and sometimes legal charges—as a form of “street justice,”
sometimes in response for noncompliance, resistance, or disrespect.176
171. See Fassin, supra note 157, at 542 (asserting that police violence is the result of societal
delegation of “a significant part of the retributive justice process to the police”); C.R. Div.,
Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 55–56 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_
police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG6K-EWJ8]; Stoughton, Principled Policing,
supra note 141, at 655. Other scholars contend that police violence against Black people has
officially been sanctioned through silence and inaction as official ratification, or judicial
ratification of those police practices. See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to
Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
125, 127 (2017); Hasbrouck, supra note 143, at 265.
172. Exum, supra note 152, at 988.
173. See generally Fassin, supra note 157 (discussing law enforcement as “suppliers of
extrajudicial punishment” around the world, including the United States); Harkin, supra note 145
(arguing that police violence should be examined in relation to “punitiveness”).
174. Fassin, supra note 157, at 547 (“[T]he fact that . . . there [are] acts of brutality and a
sense of revenge does not exclude the possibility that it is also a form of punishment, that is, the
administration of a form of justice in the street meant to correct an alleged wrong.”).
175. Id. at 559; see id. at 541–42 (“Because it is a justified or justifiable practice in the eyes
of many officers, because it is effectively protected by the institution, because it is treated with
clemency by the judges, because it may even be encouraged by the state, and perhaps above all
because it targets certain populations, . . . I argue that it should be regarded as a form of
punishment. Far from being a deviant practice, it reveals that, for what concerns its lower
segments, society delegates a significant part of the retributive justice process to the police.”).
176. See Exum, supra note 152, at 998 (arguing that police killings in the line of duty are
comparable to punishment because “individuals are being executed for their perceived
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And like punishment within the criminal legal system, police use of force
may be linked to officers’ social attitudes, biases, and perceptions.177
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) investigation of the Ferguson
Police Department after an officer shot and killed Michael Brown
revealed evidence of “punitive and retaliatory” excessive force.178
Ferguson Police appeared to use canines to apprehend suspects, “not to
counter a physical threat but to inflict punishment.”179 The DOJ observed
that “[t]he use of canines and [electronic control weapons], in particular,
appear[ed] prone to . . . abuse by [the Ferguson Police Department].”180
Officers also used excessive force against individuals who declined to
stop and speak to them: “[f]orce at times appeared to be used as
punishment for non-compliance with an order that lacked legal
authority.”181

objectionable response to a police encounter”); Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing:
Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies,
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 492 n.18 (2008) (discussing the beating of Rodney King and
other incidents of police brutality); Li Cohen, Former Aurora Cop Admits to Ignoring Black
Woman’s Cries for Help After She Fell Head-First on the Floor While Hogtied in a Patrol Car,
CBS NEWS (Oct. 1, 2020, 9:45 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/aurora-police-officerignored-black-woman-back-of-patrol-car/ [https://perma.cc/HAR4-L53J] (reporting that a police
officer “hobble[d]” a woman, who later fell head-first in the police car, because she attempted to
get out of the squad car, even though it is not possible to exit the backseat of a police car from
inside); Azi Paybarah, Eight Police Officers in Louisiana Face Charges of Excessive Force, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/us/louisiana-police-violenceexcessive-force.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article
[https://perma.cc/
V9KQ-YB88] (describing an incident during which eight law enforcement officers assaulted two
men in a truck who had initially refused to stop for the police); see also Stoughton, Principled
Policing, supra note 141, at 654–55 (discussing the “Warrior” mentality, in which “disrespect is
tantamount to resistance, and resistance indicates than an individual is one of the ‘bad guy[s],’ an
‘enemy’”(alteration in original)).
177. Harkin, supra note 145, at 51 (observing that policing is connected to “wider social
attitudes,” and that “police share the imprint of social attitudes towards race, class, gender, age,
sexuality and migration status, illustrating the influence of popular emotions on punitive
eligibility”).
178. C.R. Div., supra note 171, at 28.
179. Id. at 33; see also Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth
Amendment, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1108, 1115 & n. 30 (2020) (describing how police bred dogs
“specifically . . . for the systematic use of putting down slave rebellions, canine warfare, colonial
enterprising, and torture” (quoting P. Khalil Saucier, Traces of the Slave Patrol: Notes on BreedSpecific Legislation, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 673, 680 (2018))).
180. C.R. Div., supra note 171, at 33; see also id. at 32–33 (describing use of canine force
without warning and in response to the flight of unarmed suspects).
181. Id. at 34–35. The Civil Rights Division’s investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department explains that officers might lack reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify
detention, but nonetheless used force to effect unlawful stops, or in some cases effected lawful
stops and then “needlessly escalate[d] the situation[s]” such that officers felt “force [wa]s
necessary.” Id at 35.
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In assessing policing and punishment, it is crucial to distinguish
between formal state-imposed retribution administered after
adjudication, and informal, or personal, retribution imposed for other
reasons. Police may lack information about a suspect’s guilt or innocence,
and their violence is often inconsistent with due process norms.182 Police
violence may often be personal to particular officers. It may be retributive
only insofar as it is what the officer administering the punishment
considers a “deserved” response to a perceived transgression.183 Yet this
justification is a poor fit if the individual is not actually violating the law,
such as refusing to stop when she is not legally required to, even if an
officer perceives her behavior to be an offense.184 It is an equally poor fit
when police violence steps beyond the bounds of a reasonable response
to a situation. But reasonableness can shield retaliatory (or retributive)
motives.185 Courts may find an officer’s punitive conduct justified under
the flexible and deferential reasonableness framework, which does not
consider an officer’s subjective motivations.186 Even if such force is not
deemed reasonable, it may not be recognized as punishment—but simply
a product of excessive force, rather than the officer’s desire for
retribution. Punitive police violence does not serve legitimate retributive
purposes. It serves personal ones.
The extrajudicial nature of police violence creates tension because it
is administered by a state authority but lacks the procedural guarantees
necessary for legitimate, socially accepted punishment. It is part of the
criminal legal system, but it is contrary to justice. This tension accounts
for some of the discomfort from using police officers as executioners. It
is similar to the tension present when one considers the idea of a physician
participating in an execution—the individual is operating outside of what

182. See Cynthia Lee, “But I Thought He Had A Gun”: Race and Police Use of a Deadly
Force, 2 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 10 (2004) (“[P]olice officers may not have time to
evaluate whether they are responding to actual danger or assumptions.”).
183. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral
culpability of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the
offender deserves it.”).
184. See Fassin, supra note 157, at 557 (“In the absence of [an] offense committed, it is
difficult to resort to the utilitarian and retributivist arguments, in a strict sense, to justify the
punishment.”).
185. See Harmon, supra note 144, at 1183 n.287 (noting that the reasonableness standard
does not consider actual motive).
186. See id. at 1151 (discussing why police may not punish); Erik Luna, Transparent
Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1114–15, 1125–26 (2000) (describing racial profiling by police
and “judicial preference” in “individualized suspicion” with “defer[ment] to reasonable
majoritarian decisions”).
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is perceived as their typical position.187 Doctors are not supposed to harm
patients.188 Police are not supposed to punish suspects. Encouraging
police to punish adds potentially impermissible features to punishment,
risks increasing public distrust of police, and intensifies cultural problems
of policing.
B. The Consequences of Police Punishment
Executions and police killings are homicides at the hands of state
authority, yet they receive different treatment and attention. Professor
Zimring asserts that this is so because, until recently, 189 capital
punishment was seen as a national policy issue and police killings were a
local problem, even though police kill more people annually than are
executed.190 Despite the frequency of police killings, the idea of
mobilizing police as executioners is disconcerting because of normative
perceptions about police and punishment, even if reality is different.
Police punishment is inconsistent with socially accepted
understandings of lawful punishment. In some ways, the violence of
unlawful and excessive force resembles historic corporal punishment
practices long since abandoned.191 It has a greater temporal and proximal
relationship to the alleged offense. Like historic punishment, police
187. See Gawande, supra note 137, at 1229 (discussing the ethical conflicts present when
physicians and medical professionals participate in executions).
188. See Kathy Oxtoby, Is the Hippocratic Oath Still Relevant to Practising Doctors Today?,
355 BMJ i6629 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.bmj.com/content/355/bmj.i6629 [https://perma.cc/
72WR-VLBJ].
189. See ZIMRING, supra note 139, at 15 (describing the rise of attention and concern toward
lethal force, which was formerly “regarded as an issue of crime policy”); India Thusi, Essay, Blue
Lives & The Permanence of Racism, 105 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 14, 15–16 (2020).
190. See ZIMRING, supra note 139, at 120–21 (contrasting the difference between number of
executions and police killings). In 2018, eight states carried out a total of twenty-five executions.
In 2019, seven states carried out a total of twenty-two executions. See Execution Database, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/execution-database?filters%5Byear
%5D=2019&filters%5Byear%5D=2018 [https://perma.cc/CQ6K-YK7N] (filtering for executions
in 2018 and 2019 only). In 2020, although the COVID-19 pandemic slowed executions, the
federal government executed nine people, and three more in January 2021. See id. (filtering for
executions in 2020 and 2021). By contrast, police kill almost 1,000 people in the United States
annually. See ZIMRING, supra note 139, at 120–21; John Sullivan et al., Four Years in a Row,
Police Nationwide Shoot Nearly 1,000 People, WASH. POST. (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/four-years-in-a-row-police-nationwide-fatallyshoot-nearly-1000-people/2019/02/07/0cb3b098-020f-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5FYD-LTSV].
191. See GARLAND, supra note 63, at 145–46 (discussing the decline in corporal punishment
in connection with “civilized” society); JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN
DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 268–70 (2012) (discussing the range
of corporal punishments in early America); see also Kleinfeld, supra note 97, at 949, 1007
(discussing the difference between punishment as “harsh treatment” and punishment as “social
control”).
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punishment commonly involves physical pain, which is “no longer the
constituent element” of punishment.192 While police punishment may be
driven by personal and emotional motives, a police officer’s status as a
state authority administering this violence expresses dueling messages of
lawlessness and authority. Certain behavior means that an offender can
be subjected to violent or dehumanizing treatment because doing so will
deter others from defying the police.193 Retributive police violence,
however, cannot be punishment.194 It is imposed without judicial process,
and lacks proportionality.195 This violence may also be spontaneous, but
retroactively justified through legal doctrines protecting police discretion
to use violent force.196
Executions, by contrast, better fit within normative social
understandings of punishment. Executions carry both punitive
justifications and expressive messages.197 The death penalty is
administered within the judicial process. Executions are deliberate acts,
intended to be divorced from spontaneous, emotional responses.
Executions—even firing squad executions—are generally sterile, formal
procedures to end an offender’s life and conceal the violence of killing.198
Brutality and extreme violence in executions may trigger negative
responses towards the institution of capital punishment or raise
constitutional concerns.
Using police officers to perform executions raises two primary issues
for policing. First, it may exacerbate the cultural problems of policing by
putting officers in a role that further departs from the policing mission.
Second, it may undermine officers’ ability to work in communities and
build community relationships. Police violence has contributed to historic
levels of distrust in police. Using Utah’s protocol means that officers will
be asked to volunteer to conduct executions, which may increase distrust
and negative perceptions of policing.
192. See FOUCAULT, supra note 96, at 11.
193. Cf. Kleinfeld, supra note 97, at 1135–36 (describing the “recklessness” and overapplication of punishment in the American criminal justice system).
194. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (defining punishment).
195. See Exum, supra note 152, at 1003 (“[W]hen it comes to the death penalty on the
streets—when death is imposed by police officers as a response to an individual’s objectionable
behavior—procedural protections are nonexistent.”).
196. See Fassin, supra note 157, at 554 (“[O]ne can see that such police operations are
conducted by a legal institution that is not designed to punish but considers itself entitled and is
incited by public authorities to do so . . . .”); supra Section II.A.
197. See Kleinfeld, supra note 97, at 941.
198. See Hayes, supra note 80 (describing firing squad executions as “instantaneous and
carried out with the utmost professionalism”); see also FOUCAULT, supra note 96, at 11 (“The
modern rituals of execution attest to this double process: the disappearance of the spectacle and
the elimination of pain.”); KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 137, at 198–200 (discussing the
contradictions of lethal injection).
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To explore the potential consequences and the impact on punishment,
this Article relies in part on the subjective meanings officers who have
served as executioners assign to their actions, particularly their
perspective on the relationship between policing and executions.199
Police officers who have spoken publicly (albeit anonymously) about
their participation in executions describe the role as one that is consistent
with their duties and obligations as police officers.200 This is consistent
with the “Warrior ethos,” which, as Professor Seth W. Stoughton
explains, “promot[es] a self-image of officers as soldiers on the front lines
in the never-ending battle to preserve order and civilization against the
forces of chaos and criminality.”201 Policing—especially as it is currently
carried out in the United States—requires police officers to “take actions
that the laws and moral standards of a free society typically forbid,”
including killing.202 The “Warrior ethos” resolves the “cognitive
dissonance” between “being a ‘good guy’ while doing bad things.”203 An
officer’s self-perception as a “Warrior” has been shown to correlate with
valuing “physical control and more favorable attitudes toward use of
force.”204 This valuation of violence is a cultural problem that skews
police perceptions of their role.205 Police participation in firing squads is
likely to exacerbate these problems.
Police officers are not supposed to kill in the line of duty except in
certain narrow circumstances.206 Participating in a firing squad requires
volunteering to intentionally kill another person without the threat

199. Other literature addressing police reform uses similar methodology. See Fassin, supra
note 157, at 554 (proposing that the meaning police assign to their actions is inconsistent with
normative criteria for punishment). See generally Stoughton, Principled Policing, supra note 141
(describing best practices for policing that reduce the use of violence among officers); Thusi,
supra note 189 (arguing that proposed Blue Lives Matter laws, designed to protect police forces,
demonstrate systemic and permanent racism in the U.S.).
200. See Kirby, supra note 77 (interviewing police officers who participated in an
execution); Hayes, supra note 80 (same).
201. Stoughton, Principled Policing, supra note 141, at 612. Stoughton identifies five
characteristics of the Warrior mentality that make it “the most highly venerated metaphor for
modern policing”: “importance, exclusivity, psychological protection, survival, and public
support.” Id. at 641; see also BALKO, supra note 151, at 325–28 (discussing problems associated
with the culture of policing).
202. Stoughton, Principled Policing, supra note 141, at 637.
203. Id.
204. See Data-driven Evidence on Warrior vs. Guardian Policing, SCIENCEDAILY (Feb. 26,
2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/02/190226155011.htm [https://perma.cc/
F2W5-5GX2]; Kyle McLean et al., Police Officers as Warriors or Guardians: Empirical Reality
or Intriguing Rhetoric?, 37 JUST. Q. 1096, 1110 (2019).
205. Stoughton, Principled Policing, supra note 141, at 615.
206. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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typically required for a justifiable officer-involved shooting.207 Officer
executioners recognize the difference between killing in the line of duty
and performing an execution, but emphasize that the results are the
same.208 One anonymous officer, who was a member of the firing squad
that killed John Albert Taylor in 1996, said in an interview, “To me, it
was just an assignment, nothing more than getting an order to do
something like kicking in a door to serve a warrant.”209 Treating
executions as an act consistent with the ordinary functions of policing
risks blurring the already indistinct lines between policing and punishing,
to the detriment of both. Blurring those lines allows a police officer to
describe volunteering to kill another human being as an act of “100
percent justice.”210
Giving the task of punishment to police may further entrench the
Warrior culture. Inviting police to engage in lawfully sanctioned, violent
punishment may further promote the ideal that violence is justice.211
Relying on police to volunteer for executions in their home jurisdictions
risks cementing the adversarial approach to policing with its
corresponding negative impacts on relationships between police and the
communities they serve.212 This concern is heightened because, despite
centralized execution sites, capital punishment is highly localized.213
Most death sentences come from a handful of counties.214 Local
prosecutors determine whether to seek a death sentence and jurors—who
are intended to represent the conscience of their community—decide

207. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others,
it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”).
208. See Hayes, supra note 80 (“Zimmerman [a former police chief who investigated the
murder Taylor committed] points out that an officer who saw Taylor running from the murder
scene with a gun and shot him would have been considered a hero. ‘Both ways, we killed him,’
he said.”).
209. Kirby, supra note 77.
210. Hayes, supra note 80.
211. See GARLAND, supra note 63, at 189 (explaining that support for capital punishment in
“rural Western states” is “grounded in traditional practices of community self-help, a culture of
masculine honor, and a relatively high tolerance of physical violence”).
212. See Stoughton, Principled Policing, supra note 141, at 656–57.
213. See GARLAND, supra note 63, at 177 (“This persistence of localism is highly pertinent
to death penalty politics, having shaped America’s engagement with capital
punishment . . . . [S]ince the 1970s, the right to retain capital punishment has come to symbolize
for many the assertion of states’ rights and local autonomy.”).
214. GARRETT, supra note 10, at 138–40 (demonstrating that “death sentences come from a
shrinking group of individual counties”); Adam Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The
Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 314–18 (2010)
(describing discrepancies among counties in seeking and imposing capital sentences).
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whether to impose that sentence.215 Some counties may have a
disproportionate number of executions to carry out, which may make it
difficult to locate sufficient officers willing to volunteer or force counties
to rely on a small group of dedicated volunteers. For example, there are
over 700 people on California’s death row.216 Approximately 222 of them
are from Los Angeles County, which “[i]n the last five
years . . . produced more death sentences per capita than any large county
in Texas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah or Washington—and sent
more people to death row than the states of Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Tennessee and Virginia combined.”217 Recent incidents
involving the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department have negatively affected community
confidence and trust.218 Although the likelihood of executions in
California, particularly firing squad executions, is slim at the moment
given California’s long-standing moratorium, police may have a difficult
time building community trust if they volunteer to execute members of
those communities.219 Other jurisdictions that may be more likely to
adopt the firing squad reflect similar statistical disparities.220 Even if
215. See GARRETT, supra note 10, at 149–50 & n.20 (discussing prosecutors’ role in the death
penalty); GARLAND, supra note 63, at 273 (“[T]he most important decisions in death penalty
proceedings are now made by locally elected officials and by juries selected from the local
community.”).
216. See California, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/
california-governor-announces-moratorium-on-executions
[https://perma.cc/HR7P-TUP9].
Governor Newsom imposed a moratorium on the death penalty after taking office. See Tim
Arango, California Death Penalty Suspended; 737 Inmates Get Stay of Execution, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/us/california-death-penalty.html
[https://perma.cc/592L-8WMJ].
217. Sam Levin, In Los Angeles, Only People of Color Are Sentenced to Death, GUARDIAN
(June 18, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jun/18/los-angelesdeath-penalty-sentences-jackie-lacey [https://perma.cc/73JA-99BL]. Virginia abolished the death
penalty in March 2021. See Whittney Evans, Virginia Governor Signs Law Abolishing the Death
Penalty, a 1st in the South, NPR (Mar. 24, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/
03/24/971866086/virginia-governor-signs-law-abolishing-the-death-penalty-a-1st-in-the-south
[https://perma.cc/9Z4G-UJUS].
218. See Alene Tchekmedyian, Can You Trust the Police to Tell the Truth? Reliability Under
Scrutiny as Cases Tossed, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2020-08-31/la-county-sheriff-deputies-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/ZF2B-JR9A];
Alene Tchekmedyian & Maya Lau, L.A. County Deputy Alleges “Executioner” Gang Dominates
Compton Sheriff Station, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2020, 4:18 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2020-07-30/sheriff-clique-compton-station-executioners [https://perma.cc/FG7
A-D4Z5].
219. See ELIZABETH HINTON, AMERICA ON FIRE: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE
AND BLACK REBELLION SINCE THE 1960S 15 (2021) (“[P]olice violence precipitates community
violence.”).
220. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 941 (Breyer, J., dissenting); John H. Blume et al.,
When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina’s Return to the Standardless Capital Sentencing
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executioners’ identities are shielded from the public, knowing that
officers in one’s local police department have volunteered to conduct
executions may well produce unease and discomfort in dealing with
police, even in routine matters.
Racial disparities associated with policing and the death penalty are
likely to further impact community trust. Racial bias in the death penalty
is well-known and well-documented.221 South Carolina, for example, has
executed 284 people since 1912.222 75 of those people were white, and
209 were Black.223 Levels of public trust in the police are at a national
low, due in part to police killings of unarmed Black men. 224 Professor
Zimring’s analysis of police killings reveals that Black people are
“overrepresented” in police killings in comparison to their proportion to
the general population.225 Relying on police officers to conduct
executions may only increase concerns about the impact of
Regime of the Pre-Furman Era, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 479, 529 n.217 (2010); supra note 213
and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987); Alexis Hoag, Valuing
Black Lives: A Case for Ending the Death Penalty, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 983, 992–96
(2020) (identifying racial disparities in capital punishment); Scott Phillips & Justin Marceau,
Whom the State Kills, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585, 605–07 (2020); James D. Unnever et al.,
Race, Racism and Support for Capital Punishment, in 37 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 45, 69 (Michael Tonry ed., 2008) (finding that “racial animus is one of the most
consistent and robust predictors of support for the death penalty”); Lincoln Caplan, Racial
Discrimination and Capital Punishment: The Indefensible Death Sentence of Duane Buck, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/racial-discriminationand-capital-punishment-the-indefensible-death-sentence-of-duane-buck [https://perma.cc/SJW4GS3A].
222. Death Row/Capital Punishment, S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.doc.sc.gov/news/
deathrow.html [https://perma.cc/AMM4-8ZSH].
223. Id.
224. See Aimee Ortiz, Confidence in Police Is at Record Low, Gallup Survey Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/gallup-poll-police.html
[https://perma.cc/AV2D-N292] (confidence in police is at 48% nationally); Jeffrey M. Jones, In
U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP (June 19, 2015), https://news.gallup.com/
poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx [https://perma.cc/4LH5-SUMK] (confidence in
police at 52% in 2015); see also Alexandra Klein & Brandon Hasbrouck, A Few Words for the
Firing Squad, NATION (May 24, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/south-carolinafiring-squad/ [https://perma.cc/AN8A-JCGG (describing how public trust in police reached
historically low levels after the murder of George Floyd by police officer Derek Chauvin);
NATHAN JAMES ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV, R43904, PUBLIC TRUST AND LAW ENFORCEMENT—A
DISCUSSION FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43904.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6W49-UGPJ] (summarizing various polls tracking public confidence in the police).
225. ZIMRING, supra note 139, at 46 (noting that Black people “account for 12.2 percent of
the 2010 census population but 26.1 percent of all killings by police in service calls and patrol”).
Professor Zimring examined statistics from several sources and observed that other statistics show
a “much larger discrepancy.” Id. at 47; see also Raff Donelson, Commentary, Blacks, Cops, and
the State of Nature, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 184–85 (2017) (discussing the higher rate of
police killings of Black people than White people in the U.S.).
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discrimination and exacerbate distrust of police, especially in
communities that have ongoing problems with excessive use of police
force or police killings.226
These two issues reflect two larger problems in capital punishment.
The first is a concern about capital punishment that scholars and legal
practitioners have discussed since eighteenth-century criminologist and
philosopher Cesare Beccaria’s observations in On Crimes and
Punishment: executions increase social brutality.227 This concern is
especially urgent considering the critical problem of excessive force and
limited accountability for that use of force among police officers. If
capital punishment is intended to deter violence, then it should not be
carried out in a way that encourages additional—and often unlawful—
violence. Police participation in executions risks reinforcing negative
aspects of policing culture. Even philosopher Immanuel Kant, who
favored capital punishment, recognized that executions should not be
performed in a way that increases brutality and diminishes the humanity
of those performing the execution.228
Second, as the next Part explores in greater detail, capital punishment
has struggled to navigate the line between retribution and vengeance.
Retributivism is, as a matter of Supreme Court precedent, a valid
justification for capital punishment. The Supreme Court has insisted that
appropriately channeled retribution serves social-stabilizing functions,
minimizing opportunities for vigilantism and vengeance. An execution
protocol that relies on law enforcement officers as executioners,
especially if those officers are from the jurisdiction where the crime took
place, risks personalizing executions and verging towards vengeance,
which undermines purported justifications for capital punishment.
III. ILLEGITIMATE VIOLENCE
The death penalty “must serve legitimate and substantial penological
goals in order to survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny.”229 Retribution is
one of the most common justifications for capital punishment.230
226. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
227. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 70–71
(Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764) (“The death
penalty is not useful because of the example of savagery it gives to men.”).
228. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
229. Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citing
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312–13 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
230. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 930 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, as the Court
has recognized, the death penalty’s penological rationale in fact rests almost exclusively upon a
belief in its tendency to deter and upon its ability to satisfy a community’s interest in retribution.”);
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 79–80 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining
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Punishment also expresses a community’s moral anger and
condemnation.231
Expressive messages associated with punishment may be aimed at
both the offender and a larger audience.232 Decisions about punishment
carry significant symbolism, even if the justification for punishment does
not rely on that symbolism. Whom the state punishes, how the state
punishes, and whom the state designates to punish all are significant
decisions that can carry expressive messages. The death penalty, like all
punishment, carries significant expressive messages, even if it is justified
by retribution, rather than the expressive messages in a death sentence.233
The same is true of how states choose to execute people.234
State punishment is a critical tool of social control and sovereignty.235
Punishment “is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely
on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.”236
Decisions about who society punishes, why it punishes, and how much it
should punish implicate state control over individuals’ lives and their
that retribution is “the primary rationale for imposing the death penalty”); Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (“[T]he primary justification for the death penalty is retribution.”),
overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016); see also Cotton, supra note 161, at 1361 (“It
would make more sense to say that the purpose of criminal punishment is retribution, and other
incidental purposes may be served only so long as they do not interfere with or subordinate the
achievement of retribution.”).
231. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[C]apital
punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”); Joel
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965) (arguing that the
essential feature of punishment is its expressive and condemnatory function); Chad Flanders,
Time, Death, and Retribution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 434 (2016); Kleinfeld, supra note 97,
at 940.
232. See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 428 n.99,
429 (2005).
233. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (plurality opinion); Flanders, supra note 231, at 434–35;
Kleinfeld, supra note 97, at 985 (“[Capital punishment] is best interpreted as an expressive claim
to the effect that the very worst wrongs are so serious as to forfeit one’s moral humanity, and with
it, the rights grounded in one’s moral humanity, including the right to life.”); see also Furman,
408 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The unusual severity of death is manifested most
clearly in its finality and enormity. Death, in these respects, is in a class by itself.”).
234. See generally Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of
the Death Penalty in the United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789 (2008) (discussing the states’
methods of execution and how these various methods have formed the country’s perception of the
death penalty).
235. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., concurring).
236. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion); see also Paul Butler, Retribution, for
Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1879 (1999) (“[S]ome retributivists believe that punishment by
the government is necessary because without it those who suffer injury would retaliate on their
own.”). On the other hand, a preference for capital punishment has significant connections to
cultures of vigilantism. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 89–118 (2003).

2022]

WHEN POLICE VOLUNTEER TO KILL

243

ethical, legal, and moral obligations. Because acts of punishment are
typically impermissible, the state’s justification for punishment and the
methods by which it punishes require legitimacy and perceptions of
fairness.237 Recognition of a state’s authority to punish is essential to the
legitimacy of that state because it demonstrates the state’s monopoly on
violence.
This Part explores these issues as they pertain to the firing squad in
greater detail. Capital punishment has been justified by its socialstabilizing functions. If it is undertaken in a way that undermines those
functions, by encouraging vengeance and weakening other components
of the criminal legal system, then it is no longer serving those functions,
undermining the legitimacy of the particular punishment. Section III.A
discusses the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Furman and Gregg,
particularly the Court’s disagreement on the role of retribution and the
social-stabilizing functions of capital punishment. It argues that these
values must carry over to executions and explores the Court’s methodof-execution jurisprudence, concluding that the Eighth Amendment’s
focus on physical pain is not the only standard for gauging the
constitutionality of a method of execution. Section III.B explores the
retributive functions of the firing squad and how those further exacerbate
the negative consequences of relying on police as executioners. Section
III.C addresses why using police as executioners undermines the
purportedly social-stabilizing functions of capital punishment and its
legitimacy. Section III.D addresses the applicability of these arguments
to the current status of firing squad executions.
A. Channeled Retribution
At one point, the Supreme Court announced that retribution was no
longer the “dominant objective of the criminal law.”238 Furman reflected
the Court’s internal conflicts about the role of retribution. The Justices
disagreed on whether retribution was an adequate justification for capital
punishment, whether community preference for retribution contradicted
the Eighth Amendment, and whether capital punishment, as
administered, even served its purported justifications. The Justices did
seem to agree that the legitimacy of capital punishment depended upon
its underlying justifications. Whether community preference supported
the punishment depended upon each Justice’s perception of retribution.
237. Cf. Furman, 408 U.S. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[A] penalty may be cruel and
unusual because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose.”).
238. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). Scholars agreed. See Hugo Adam
Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601, 601 (1978); Cotton, supra note
161, at 1352–54; David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623
n.1 (1992).
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Justice William J. Brennan Jr. disagreed that the death penalty “serves
to manifest the community’s outrage at the commission of the crime.”239
From his perspective, the public perception that “death is a just
punishment” did not warrant the imposition of capital punishment240
because of the way communities imposed capital punishment.241 Other
punishments, he insisted, adequately satisfied the states’ desire for
retribution and carried expressive messages of public condemnation.242
Similarly, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that, while retribution may
be a permissible goal of punishment, “retribution for its own sake” could
not “become the State’s sole end in punishing.”243 Like Justice Brennan,
he rejected community and legislative preference as the sole justification
for any form of punishment.244 Under that rationale, “all penalties
selected by [a] legislature would by definition be acceptable means for
designating society’s moral approbation of a particular act,” and
effectively “read out” the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions on cruel and
unusual punishment.245 Community desires could not override
constitutional limits.
Justice Potter Stewart, whose vote would be crucial four years later in
Gregg, accepted public preference more readily, observing that “[t]he
instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man.”246 Because retribution
is an inherent part of human nature, Justice Stewart argued that a criminal
justice system that “channel[ed]” retribution served social-stabilizing
functions.247 He explained, “[w]hen people begin to believe that
organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal
offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of
anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.”248 Justice
239. Furman, 408 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 304.
241. See id. at 303 (expressive messages); id. at 304–05 (retribution).
242. See id. at 303–04 (“To serve that purpose our laws distribute punishments according to
the gravity of crimes and punish more severely the crimes society regards as more serious. That
purpose cannot justify any particular punishment as the upper limit of severity.”); id. at 304
(“When the overwhelming number of criminals who commit capital crimes go to prison, it cannot
be concluded that death serves the purpose of retribution more effectively than imprisonment.”).
243. See id. at 343 & n.86 (Marshall, J., concurring).
244. See id. at 344–45.
245. Id. at 344.
246. See id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring).
247. See id.
248. Id. For an expansion on these arguments, see Charles J. Bonaparte, Lynch Law and Its
Remedy, 8 YALE L.J. 335, 341–42 (1899), arguing that expanding capital punishment would limit
lynching, which happens because the government fails to administer justice in a way consistent
with the community’s moral values. But see Furman, 408 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“If capital crimes require the punishment of death in order to provide moral reinforcement for
the basic values of the community, those values can only be undermined when death is so rarely
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Stewart did not elaborate on why he believed that capital punishment was
necessary to satisfy retributive instincts.249 A legislature’s belief that the
penalty served retributive justifications was enough. Here, he was in
closer agreement with the dissenters.250 Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., for
example, agreed that controlled violence based on perceptions of the
offender’s desert served stabilizing functions.251
Despite this conflict, Gregg expressly designated retribution as a key
justification for capital punishment, with deterrence serving as a
supporting (if questionable) justification.252 The theory of retribution that
Gregg articulated emphasized the expressive value in giving rein to
community preference and impulse. It crystalized the “social-stabilizing”
thesis: structured retribution in a criminal legal system that responds to
“society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct,” is necessary
to minimize extrajudicial violence.253 Channeling retribution preserves
the legitimacy of government and the social order by preventing
inflicted upon the criminals who commit the crimes. Furthermore, it is certainly doubtful that the
infliction of death by the State does in fact strengthen the community’s moral code; if the
deliberate extinguishment of human life has any effect at all, it more likely tends to lower our
respect for life and brutalize our values.”).
249. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The constitutionality of capital
punishment in the abstract is not, however, before us in these cases.”).
250. See id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has consistently assumed that
retribution is a legitimate dimension of the punishment of crimes.”); id. at 453 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (“While retribution alone may seem an unworthy justification in a moral sense, its
utility in a system of criminal justice requiring public support has long been recognized.”).
251. See id. at 453–54.
252. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 930 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he death
penalty’s penological rationale in fact rests almost exclusively upon a belief in its tendency to
deter and upon its ability to satisfy a community’s interest in retribution.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183–84 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Bedau, supra note 238, at 602 (“Even the
Bill of Rights has been interpreted in the last few years by the Supreme Court . . . so that it now
accommodates retributive purposes in general and on behalf of the severest mode of
punishment—the death penalty—in particular.”). Some argue that the death penalty serves as a
general deterrent to capital offenses. See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 20 (2011); PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE CURRENT DEBATE 20 (Robert
M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1995). Research suggests that there is little to no evidence
that capital punishment deters. See Glossip, 576 U.S. at 930–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting
studies); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 79 & n.13 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184–85 (plurality opinion); Robert Apel et al., Is Capital Punishment an
Effective Deterrent for Murder? An Updated Review of Research and Theory, in AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 32, at 271, 273; HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH
IS DIFFERENT 31–38 (1987); Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death
Penalty: The Views of Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1996); Carol S. Steiker, No,
Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty,
58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 775–79 (2005).
253. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion) (“This function may be unappealing to many,
but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than
self-help to vindicate their wrongs.”).
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vigilantism and other unsanctioned forms of retaliation.254 Gregg also
accepted community and legislative preference, deferring to “the moral
consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a
sanction.”255 Relying on social preference, in other words, demonstrated
legitimacy.
Justice Marshall’s dissent skewered the majority’s focus on social
stability—a community’s preference for a particular form of punishment
did not outweigh the values of human dignity inherent in the Eighth
Amendment.256 A community’s desire to impose death could never allow
a punishment that would deny “the wrongdoer’s dignity and worth.”257
Capital punishment was not necessary to reflect community outrage and
prevent “the American people from taking the law into their own
hands.”258
Since Gregg, the Court has emphasized deterrence and retribution in
considering the applicability of capital punishment to certain offenders or
offenses.259 Capital punishment may be unconstitutional when it fails to
serve those goals because either the offender’s culpability or the offense
is disproportionate to the penalty.260 The Court has relied on retribution
to preserve the broader institution of capital punishment: only the most
254. See id. at 183–84.
255. Id. at 186–87.
256. See id. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he implication of the statements appears to
me to be quite different—namely, that society’s judgment that the murderer ‘deserves’ death must
be respected not simply because the preservation of order requires it, but because it is appropriate
that society make the judgment and carry it out.”).
257. Id. at 240–41.
258. Id. at 238.
259. For example, death row prisoners have alleged that the delays between conviction and
execution render capital punishment unconstitutional because the length and nature of that
punishment have already satisfied the state’s interest in retribution, and the delay ultimately
becomes cruel and unusual punishment. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995)
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 925 (2015) (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369–70, 1373–78 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting); Flanders, supra note 231, at 431–33, 438; see also John D. Bessler, The Anomaly of
Executions: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the 21st Century, 2 BRIT. J. AM.
LEGAL STUD. 297, 444 (2013) (“[T]he failure of the Supreme Court to take up the question of
whether it is ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment to execute inmates who have spent in some cases
more than 25 years on death row is inexplicable.”).
260. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800–01 (1982) (finding that whether retribution
justifies execution is based on the offender’s culpability); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571
(2005) (“Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that
death penalty is excessive for rape); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836–38 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (finding that death penalty for offenders under 16 years of age is excessive);
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420, modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317–18 (2002) (discussing diminished culpability of “mentally
retarded offenders”).
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culpable deserve the death penalty.261 Assessments of culpability connect
to capital punishment’s purported social-stabilizing function by
channeling the community outrage to the most atrocious crimes,
purportedly preventing vigilantism and lawlessness.262
This emphasis on retribution has affected the Court’s method-ofexecution jurisprudence. The Court has insisted that because capital
punishment is constitutional, there has to be a constitutional way of
carrying it out.263 The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that
include “torture” and “unnecessary cruelty.”264 In In re Kemmler,265 the
Court famously explained, “Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.”266 In this inquiry, the Court has primarily focused
on pain, although it has sometimes considered the mental and emotional
impact of a punishment.267
At one time, the Supreme Court had linked the limits of punishment
to human dignity and “civilized standards.”268 A punishment violated the
Eighth Amendment when it was inconsistent with “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”269
261. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes
them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319)); Kennedy, 554 U.S.
at 420; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. But see Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Observations About the Worst
of the Worst, Virginia-Style, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 469, 470 (2021) (arguing that
execution in practice is not limited to most culpable offenders and using Virginia’s history of
executions as an example).
262. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (“Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s
moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for
retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”); Ceja, 134 F.3d at 1373–74 (Fletcher,
J., dissenting).
263. Glossip, 576 U.S. at 869.
264. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878); see also supra notes 48–54 and
accompanying text (discussing Wilkerson).
265. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
266. Id. at 447.
267. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (explaining that the severity of
cadena temporal, or imprisonment for more than twelve years at “hard and painful labor” and in
chains, leaves an offender “subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars
and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty”).
268. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
269. Id. at 101; see Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (explaining that the Eighth Amendment should
“acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice”); see also
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (evaluating whether making drug addiction a
criminal offense violates the Eighth Amendment by considering “contemporary human
knowledge”); Bessler, supra note 259, at 392–96 (tracing origins of Supreme Court’s reference
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Social preference mattered, but it was an aspirational, forward-looking
standard. More recently, the Court has signaled its preference for a
narrower conception of the Eighth Amendment.270 As in Gregg, the
Court’s vision of the kinds of punishment the Eighth Amendment
prohibits defers substantially to legislative and community preference.271
“The deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our
federal system, . . . is enhanced where the specification of punishments is
concerned, for ‘these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.’”272
In practice, this deference has sharply curtailed the Eighth
Amendment’s applicability to methods of execution. Even if a death row
prisoner can demonstrate that a state’s method of execution is likely to
cause severe pain and suffering, if there are no available alternatives, the
state may proceed.273 Bucklew v. Precythe274 took this restriction further:
states do not have to be the first to test a method of execution, and
prisoners have a heavy burden to prove that there is a readily available
alternative that will reduce a substantial risk of pain from the state’s
chosen method.275 Bucklew also demonstrates that a majority of the Court
has totally abandoned the evolving standards of decency standard: the
to contemporary standards in deciding Eighth Amendment claims); Denno, supra note 26, at 329–
30, 329 n.40 (explaining that Weems held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply solely to
punishments considered cruel and unusual at the time of the Amendment’s passage); Gardner,
supra note 24, at 103–04 (explaining how Weems and Trop broke from the “historical
interpretation” that had formerly been used to resolve Eighth Amendment claims in favor of
drawing from contemporary standards of civility).
270. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123–25 (2019) (stating that the Eighth
Amendment permits pain in death, relying on a separate opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas in
Baze). Justice Neil Gorsuch signaled his willingness to adopt an even harsher standard, observing
that Justices Antonin Scalia and Thomas had argued in earlier cases that “an inmate must show
that the State intended its method to inflict such pain.” Id. at 1126; Eric Berger, Gross Error, 91
WASH. L. REV. 929, 981 (2016) (concluding that Glossip is inconsistent with the “evolving
standards of decency” analysis).
271. See Guus Duindam, Judicial Incoherence, Capital Punishment, and the Legalization of
Torture: A Response to Glossip v. Gross and Bucklew v. Precythe, 108 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 74, 75
(2019) (discussing the “extraordinary shift in the Court’s thinking—away from its long-held view
that the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment’ is ‘the dignity of man’” (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion))).
272. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (plurality opinion)); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 456
(1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
273. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 879 (2015) (requiring prisoners to plead an
alternative method of execution); id. at 949 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“A method of execution
that is intolerably painful—even to the point of being the chemical equivalent of burning alive—
will, the Court holds, be unconstitutional if, and only if, there is a ‘known and available
alternative’ method of execution.”).
274. 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
275. See id. at 1130 (“But choosing not to be the first to experiment with a new method of
execution is a legitimate reason to reject it.”); id. at 1129 (faulting Bucklew for failing to provide
a detailed protocol).
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Eighth Amendment prohibits “long disused (unusual) forms of
punishment that intensified the sentence of death with a (cruel)
‘superadd[ition]’ of ‘terror, pain, or disgrace.’”276 Under the
“superadded” Bucklew standard, states cannot burn prisoners alive, flay
them, tear them apart with horses, whip them to death, display or dissect
a prisoner’s corpse, or disembowel prisoners.277 But this standard states
the obvious and the irrelevant because states are unlikely to resume these
practices. Instead, executions may cause the amount of pain that is
necessary to kill—even if that pain could be potentially severe.278 Under
this standard, pain has less constitutional significance in capital
punishment.279
Like the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on police violence, Bucklew
assumes that a certain amount of violence and suffering will happen, that
it is acceptable, and that it is not a matter for judicial scrutiny.280 Bucklew,
in other words, like the Court’s precedent that grants police wide
discretion in the use of force, affirms that states have similar discretion
when they kill prisoners who have been sentenced to death.281 But state
discretion should not extend to violence that relies on retributivism for its
own sake, retaliation, or vengeance.282
Even if pain is not at issue, carrying out capital punishment in a way
that is a “pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes” is “patently
excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment.”283 The Court sustained the continued use of capital
276. Id. at 1124 (alteration in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008)
(plurality opinion)).
277. Id. at 1123–24; see id. at 1135 (Thomas, J., concurring) (listing various forms of torture
and execution); Glossip, 576 U.S. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits
various gruesome punishments that were common in Blackstone’s day.”); Bessler, supra note
259, at 304–05.
278. See Glossip, 576 U.S. at 869 (“[B]ecause some risk of pain is inherent in any method
of execution, we have held that the Constitution does not require the avoidance of all risk of
pain.”); SARAT, supra note 98, at 71.
279. I explore these issues in greater detail in a forthcoming work. See Alexandra L. Klein,
The Irrelevance of Pain (forthcoming) (on file with author).
280. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1125 (“The Eighth Amendment does not come into play unless
the risk of pain associated with the State’s method is ‘substantial when compared to a known and
available alternative.’” (quoting Glossip, 576 U.S. at 878)).
281. See id. (discussing state discretion in executions); supra Section III.A.
282. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations
for a government in a free society.”).
283. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without
comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting
mindless vengeance, the restriction [on executing an insane person] finds enforcement in the
Eighth Amendment.”).
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punishment as an expression of community retribution and outrage. That
outrage does not extend to the method of execution. Some punishments
go beyond permissible bounds by the pain they inflict, the indignities they
cause, or the ways in which they undermine the justifications for the
punishment.284 Punishment that fails to serve any justification may
violate the Eighth Amendment.285 This reasoning extends to punishment
that serves illegitimate justifications. Punishments that draw on vengeful
or retaliatory motives are more than “the mere extinguishment of life.”286
Professor Austin D. Sarat argues that the legitimacy of state killing
depends upon the method of execution,287 which “must appear to be
different from the violence to which it is opposed and to which it is seen
as a response.”288 When punishment begins to take on impermissible
features, such as brutality, arbitrariness, or vengeance, it undermines the
legitimacy of that punishment as a state tool.289 A method of execution
that fails to further the goals of punishment, or only serves impermissible
forms of those goals, is inconsistent with the constitutional requirements
of punishment.290 Dying by firing squad may be quicker and less painful
284. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (determining
excessive punishment requires assessing proportionality and whether the punishment involves
“the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”).
285. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Under Gregg, a
punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it . . . makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering . . . .”).
286. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); see also Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368,
1373 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the Court’s treatment of the subject
of retribution definitively demonstrates that the exaction of blood vengeance is not a legitimate
basis for the imposition of the death penalty.”).
287. SARAT, supra note 10, at 5.
288. SARAT, supra note 98, at 19.
289. See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“The Court has never accepted the proposition that notions of deterrence or
retribution might legitimately be served through the infliction of pain beyond that which is
minimally necessary to terminate an individual’s life.”); SARAT, supra note 10, at 3–7.
290. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312–13 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (stating
that when the imposition of the death penalty ceases to realistically further the purpose of
justifying the social ends it was supposed to serve, it is a “pointless and needless extinction of
life” in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (explaining that capital punishment “cannot be so totally without penological
justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 319 (2002) (arguing that “mentally retarded offender[s]” be excluded from the death penalty
since the lesser culpability of these offenders does not merit the goal of retribution); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (requiring that imposition of the death penalty consider
individualization as a constitutional requirement since it was impermissible, under the Eighth
Amendment, to assign an individual who did not kill the same culpability of those who did kill);
Ceja, 134 F.3d at 1373 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (stating that the State should be required to show
that belated execution “will serve as an effective expression of the community’s moral outrage”
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than lethal injection. But how the firing squad is carried out can
undermine the legitimacy of capital punishment and even undermine
public support for capital punishment by exposing the violence of killing
in a way that lethal injection does not.291 Retribution may be a permissible
supporting justification to impose punishment. Its attendant expressive
features reflect community condemnation. But drawing too much upon
personalized, localized outrage may venture beyond retribution.
B. Community Retribution
Executions, and the way they are carried out, carry expressive
messages. Legislative discussions about the firing squad focused on these
messages.292 Some Utah legislators thought that other methods of
execution did not transmit the same retributive and deterrent messages
that the firing squad did.293 South Carolina legislators, however, were
preoccupied with ensuring that the state retained the death penalty and its
retributivist messaging.294 Both legislatures emphasized that the firing
squad would be less painful than either lethal injection or electrocution.295
Professor Deborah W. Denno has argued that legislatures retain methods
of execution that may be more painful to “reflect what they consider to
be the public’s views toward punishment,”296 particularly symbolic
values of “‘moral outrage’ or ‘revenge-utilitarianism’ toward
criminals.”297 But the firing squad may be less painful than some lethal
injection protocols, provided it is carried out correctly.298 Nor is there any
when justifying execution under the goal of retribution); see also SARAT, supra note 98, at 19–22
(discussing legitimacy of state violence).
291. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 977 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“A return
to the firing squad—and the blood and physical violence that comes with it—is a step in the
opposite direction. And some might argue that the visible brutality of such a death could
conceivably give rise to its own Eighth Amendment concerns.”).
292. See supra Section II.B (discussing the Utah firing squad debates).
293. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text; see also Denno, supra note 26, at 388–
90 (arguing that states switch execution methods to keep capital punishment in anticipation of a
constitutional challenge to a particular method).
295. See supra notes 110, 120 and accompanying text.
296. Denno, supra note 26, at 391.
297. Id. at 392–93 (footnotes omitted).
298. For a discussion of the different types of lethal injection protocols and their potential
for pain, see Eric Berger, Evolving Standards of Lethal Injection, in THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF PUNISHMENT 234, 247–49 (Meghan J. Ryan & William W.
Berry III eds., 2020). Professor Sarat calculates that states have botched 7.12% of their lethal
injection executions. See SARAT, supra note 10, at 177; see also sources cited supra note 10
(addressing botched lethal injections). Recent investigations have revealed that 84% of prisoners
who died by lethal injection suffered pulmonary edema during the execution, meaning their lungs
filled with fluid, causing sensations of suffocation and drowning. See Noah Caldwell et al.,
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evidence that a particular method of execution provides more of a
deterrent than the existence of capital punishment.299 Retribution, and its
attendant expressive messages, is a far more salient feature of the firing
squad.
There are two features of the firing squad that are most relevant in
considering retributive justifications. First, the overt violence of the
method directly contrasts with the historic trajectory of capital
punishment, which prioritizes technological refinement to achieve a
purportedly more humane and less overtly violent method of execution.
Second, the way in which executions are carried out emphasizes local
involvement in executions and self-selection among law enforcement.
This Section addresses both in turn and describes how they exacerbate
the negative consequences associated with relying on law enforcement
officers as executioners.
As Part II discussed, early firing squad executions included
symbolism intended to connect to local control, such as the choice of
execution site, the executioners, or the weapons used.300 Modern firing
executions lack the heavy-handed symbolism of shooting the condemned
with the murder weapon, but the inherent spectacle remains. The open
violence of the firing squad is inconsistent with modern, medicalized
executions. For that reason, its use and adoption carry distinct,
expressive, and highly retributive messages.
Death by firing squad is more similar to criminal homicides than lethal
injection.301 Some have argued that this method, evoking lex talonis, may
Gasping for Air: Autopsies Reveal Troubling Effects of Lethal Injection, NPR (Sept. 21,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/21/793177589/gasping-for-air-autopsies-revealtroubling-effects-of-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/QBD3-4GS8]. The researchers argue that
pulmonary edema occurs because of the way states administer lethal injection drugs rather than
the type of drugs they are using. Id. Poor drug choice may also contribute to pain. See Berger,
supra note 270, at 931–32; Berger, supra (contrasting single-drug and three-drug protocols). By
contrast, the firing squad may not present the same risk of pain. See Denno, supra note 12, at 785–
87 (discussing pain in firing squad executions). Botches also appear to be far less frequent—
research indicates that there has been only two botched executions since 1879. See id. at 778
n.204, 787; see also supra note 89 (identifying two botched firing squad executions).
299. See Denno, supra note 26, at 392. But see Kerr, supra note 24, at 83 (suggesting that if
lethal injection deters, “then the graphic truth of the firing squad should increase the statistical
significance of the deterrence effect”); DiStanislao, supra note 24, at 804 (suggesting a more
significant deterrent effect may appear if Virginia were to adopt the firing squad, and maybe make
its executions public).
300. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (discussing retributive symbolism in
firing squad executions).
301. See SARAT, supra note 98, at 83; Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Regulating Death:
Capital Punishment and the Late Liberal State, 111 YALE L.J. 681, 704 (2001) (book review)
(“Capital punishment’s medicalization helps to nail down this distinction precisely because it
appears so unlike an act of bloodthirsty retaliation . . . .”). Firearm homicides make up a substantial
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better serve retributive justifications. Painless executions, after all, may
“undermine[] the very premise on which public approval of the
retribution rationale is based.”302 A firing squad execution might be less
painful than lethal injection, but the expressive-retributive messages from
strapping another human into a chair and firing four bullets into his heart
unequivocally express a community’s moral judgment that someone who
has chosen to use violence deserves an equally violent death. This is the
sort of moral judgment that some communities frequently express about
someone who dies at the hands of the government.
When the police kill a person, the victim too often loses their
presumption of innocence, regardless of the circumstances of their death.
To die at the hands of the police is to die under suspicion.303 Relying on
law enforcement perspectives creates a presumption that the violence was
justifiable—and that the decedent may have deserved it for a
transgression, real or imagined. These assumptions remain despite the
fact that very few of the perceived transgressions amount to capital
offenses.
Second, localized involvement in executions enhances the risk of
transforming retribution into vengeance. As Professor David W. Garland
explains, the delocalization of capital punishment was “only ever partial,
shifting the location and control of executions but leaving prosecution
and sentencing decisions under local control.”304 Drawing executioners
from the local community attaches communities to executions in a way
that most jurisdictions have largely abandoned.305 This practice may be a
pragmatic choice to find executioners, but it personalizes the execution
part of all homicides in the United States. See Assault or Homicide, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm [https://perma
.cc/UR57-VDLN].
302. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 80–81 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 301, at 704 (“What Blanchard and Scalia both understand is that
execution by lethal injection involves, on the one hand, a tension between our desire to realize the
claims of retribution by killing those who kill, and, on the other, a method that, because it seems
to do no harm other than killing, cannot satisfy the intuitive sense of equivalence that informs this
conception of justice.”).
303. See Exum, supra note 152, at 1008. Responses to unlawful police killings of Black
people sometimes focus on a perceived failure to comply—despite the fact that individuals killed
by the police were complying or engaged in totally innocent activity. See Ed. Bd., Rudy Giuliani’s
Racial Myths, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/opinion/rudygiulianis-racial-myths.html [https://perma.cc/L66F-FVRT]; see also Jamison v. McClendon, 476
F. Supp. 3d 386, 390–91 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (citing examples of Black people killed by the police).
Professor I. India Thusi observes that the “the myth of Black criminality” has justified social
control and police violence. See Thusi, supra note 189, at 23–24; see also ZIMRING, supra note
236, at 122 (“The criminal offender is an outsider in the vigilante imagination, not a genuine
member of the community.”).
304. GARLAND, supra note 63, at 116–17.
305. See id. (discussing the trend away from localized executions).
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and invites bad motives into the process. Professor Martin Gardner, in
considering the constitutionality of firing squads, briefly observed that
“[t]he involvement of ordinary citizens in the execution process allows
the firing squad to be a vehicle of public vengeance, stripping the
execution process of whatever dignity it might otherwise have.”306
Professor Gardner’s assessment addresses the real problem of the firing
squad: relying on volunteers transforms executions into a personal
exercise of public retaliation and vengeance. It carries echoes of
vigilantism.
In considering the relationship between vigilantism and capital
punishment, Professor Zimring emphasizes the contradiction between
vigilantism—which centers on a community, an individual, and the
personal—with the more formal traditions of legality and due process.307
Professor Zimring disagrees that vigilantism will inspire vengeance or
further violence. Instead, he explains, “The citizen who has positive
feelings about vigilante values will identify more closely with the
punishment process, will think of punishments as a community activity
rather than the conduct of a governmental entity separate from
community processes.”308 Yet, both vengeance and vigilantism rely on
violence as a personal response to a wrong, real or perceived.309 Leaving
punishment in a community’s control keeps that punishment personal to
the community, which seems inconsistent with Gregg. The Court’s
insistence that capital punishment is a response to public outrage and is
socially stabilizing by preventing the community from taking matters into
its own hands suggests that decisions to utilize capital punishment must
be a separate thing from a community response in executions. The place
for a moral judgment, Gregg suggests, is in the courtroom, not the
execution chamber.310
306. See Gardner, supra note 24, at 124. Professor Gardner also argued that “the firing squad
is potentially a source of torture at the hands of citizens seeking revenge,” and cited the botched
execution of Eliseo Mares in 1951 as an example to justify his argument that a firing squad is a
potentially unconstitutional method of execution. Id.; see supra note 89 and accompanying text
(discussing Eliseo Mares). Professor Gardner did not consider the distinction between ordinary
civilian participation and law enforcement participation.
307. See ZIMRING, supra note 236, at 108–09. Professor Zimring defines the “vigilante
tradition” as one in which “groups of citizens regard the punishment of criminal threats to the
community as the privilege and responsibility of dominant social groups.” Id. at 109.
308. Id. at 99. Therefore, even if citizens with vigilante preferences trust government power
less, they may be less concerned if punishment is a “local concern.” Id. at 98.
309. See CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM OF JUSTICE 55 (1999)
(emphasizing that revenge is personal); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366–68
(1981) (distinguishing retribution from revenge on the grounds that revenge is personal); SARAT,
supra note 98, at 40–43 (discussing revenge).
310. GARLAND, supra note 63, at 260 (“The Court was saying, in effect, that the states could
put people to death so long as they did not stage anything that looked like a lynching.”).
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Relying on police officer volunteers rather than ordinary civilians
does not eliminate the risk of firing squad executions becoming exercises
of public vengeance. While police are not supposed to punish,311 police
violence can go beyond violence that is necessary for enforcement,
becoming punitive, retaliatory, and vengeful.312 The ongoing problems of
policing—a lack of accountability for violence and the problem of
Warrior culture—carry the potential to enhance the risk of public
vengeance. Giving local police officers the opportunity to kill puts the
responsibility for killing squarely in the hands of community members
who may feel that the justice system is not moving quickly enough.313
Doing so risks creating perceptions of publicly endorsed vigilantism in
the same way that incidents of police violence or misconduct may be
forms of vigilantism.314
Some argue that institutionalized punishments cannot be revenge
because those who enforce the law are not specially connected to the
victims and those who punish in institutional settings are not motivated
by personal ties.315 If the police kill a person on the street, that person
does not receive a trial, appeals, or any process. A person executed by a
firing squad composed of police officers has received judicial process,
even if that process may be flawed.
Despite the process leading up to an execution, it is impossible to
escape the historical and present-day context of police killings. The
history of capital punishment in its myriad forms affects how it is
perceived today. So does the history of lynching, in which law
enforcement officers were at times complicit or active participants.316 It
is not possible to truly separate out executions from this history and the
rest of the criminal legal system. Violence cannot escape all context.
311. See supra notes 143–71 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Part III.
313. See Stoughton, Principled Policing, supra note 141, at 659 (explaining that the Warrior
officers express frustration with “laws that frustrate justice betray officers’ professional
commitment to distinguish[] right from wrong”); GARLAND, supra note 63, at 289 (discussing law
enforcement preference for capital punishment); Hayes, supra note 80 (quoting one of Taylor’s
executioners as saying that delays in the appellate process for capital prisoners were “a little out
of control,” and insisting that the penalty “needs to be used more often”).
314. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, SHADOW VIGILANTES: HOW DISTRUST
IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM BREEDS A NEW KIND OF LAWLESSNESS 186–87 (2018).
315. BARTON, supra note 309, at 55.
316. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 92–93 (1945) (stating that the sheriff
participated in beating a Black man to death in a public square); GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE
GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA 242–
44 (2012) (explaining that the sheriff and deputy shot three Black men accused of a crime, killing
two in a framed escape attempt); Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE 9, 32, 47, 56–58 (2017), https://lynchinginamerica.eji.org/report/
[https://perma.cc/4LW3-NDL7] (noting law enforcement involvement in lynchings); GARLAND,
supra note 63, at 124–25 (discussing how local law enforcement officials tolerated lynching).
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Consider this: Arizona recently began overhauling its gas chamber for
executions.317 The state purchased chemicals to make hydrogen cyanide
gas—the same type of gas the Nazis used to murder millions during the
Holocaust.318 One might point out that Arizona has used gas in executions
since 1934 and continued those executions even after the Holocaust.319
One might also point out that the people Arizona executes have been
convicted of murder and received judicial process, rather than being
deported and murdered en masse simply for existing. But despite these
observations, it is impossible to escape the historical and cultural context
of using Zyklon B to kill. The judicial process cannot remove the social
meaning of a method of execution.
Police officers who volunteer for executions may disclaim vengeance
as a motivation. In an interview with a journalist, one executioner
asserted, “I don’t think any of us were motivated by a sense of revenge.
We took it very seriously and wanted to do it right.”320 But sometimes
justice is personal—law enforcement may engage in conduct that
subverts the judicial process to ensure a conviction or to punish
arrestees.321 Officers may perceive their role in community protection as
one that includes killing.322
A jurisdictional connection for executioners necessarily personalizes
an execution, inviting vengeful or retaliatory motives, even if the officers
may not have been involved in investigations associated with the
underlying crime.323 The idealized, normative role that a police officer
should fill is inconsistent with the role of an officer as a community
avenger. Like the debate in Garner over whether the role of police
violence is to ensure punishment by any means necessary, using police
officers as executioners, especially when jurisdictional connections exist,
317. Christine Hauser, Outrage Greets Report of Arizona Plan to Use “Holocaust Gas” in
Executions, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/02/us/arizona-zyklonb-gas-chamber.html [https://perma.cc/Z3XV-WSZG].
318. Ed Pilkington, Arizona “Refurbishes” Its Gas Chamber To Prepare for Executions,
Documents Reveal, GUARDIAN (May 28, 2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/may/28/arizona-gas-chamber-executions-documents [https://perma.cc/P5PH-BZPF].
319. See Arizona, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-andfederal-info/state-by-state/arizona [https://perma.cc/59W2-GH4D].
320. Kirby, supra note 77.
321. See Lieutenant Arthur Doyle, From the Inside Looking Out: Twenty-nine Years in the
New York Police Department, in POLICE BRUTALITY 171, 173 (Jill Nelson ed., 2000) (“One rule I
learned was that any suspect who assaulted a police officer in any way was never supposed to be
able to walk into the station house on his own. He was supposed to be beaten so badly that he
couldn’t walk.”); ROBINSON & ROBINSON, supra note 314, at 186–87 (discussing the practice of
“testilying” at suppression hearings as a police response to achieve convictions); Stoughton,
Principled Policing, supra note 141, at 660–61.
322. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
323. Would-be executioners appear to receive some sort of screening, but there is little to no
information about the criteria that might disqualify an executioner.
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highlights the tension between process as justice and violence as
justice.324
The consequences of using law enforcement officers as executioners
have not been adequately explored, even where it is the norm. Utah’s
legislators critiqued the brutality of the method of execution325 but did
not discuss whether using police as executioners was sound public policy
or the potential consequences of that policy.326 Despite the publicity
surrounding firing squad executions, including interviews with police
executioners, not all of Utah’s legislators knew that law enforcement
would volunteer to conduct executions.327 Utah’s seeming indifference to
this problem is likely due to two factors. First, Utah conducts executions
infrequently—it has only executed seven people since 1976, and only
three of them by firing squad.328 Second, Utah has always carried out
firing squad executions this way.329 That is not to suggest that Utah does
not have problems associated with policing and punishment,330 but rather
that the historical roots of the practice have normalized it in the relevant
community. While the firing squad had fallen out of favor in Utah, the
decision to resume, even if it is a backup option, suggests both a
preference for maintaining capital punishment as well as the localized
relationship connected to punishment.331 By contrast, if a jurisdiction has
never used the firing squad and has relinquished local control over
executions, introducing this practice may be more problematic, especially
324. See supra notes 158–66 and accompanying text.
325. See Utah Senate Hearing, supra note 104, at 1:08:25–1:09:10 (discussing what was
meant by a statement that abolishing the firing squad would allow Utah to join the “civilized
world”).
326. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 111–12 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
329. See GARLAND, supra note 63, at 189–90 (discussing the social role and norms of the
death penalty in the rural west); see also supra Section I.A (discussing Utah’s history of utilizing
volunteer firing squads to carry out executions).
330. For example, between 2005 and 2014, Utah police officers shot and killed eighty-seven
people. See Fatal Shootings By Law Enforcement, SALT LAKE TRIB., http://local.sltrib.com/charts/
shootings/policeshootings.html [https://perma.cc/74AC-2XWW]. In 2020 alone, there were
twenty-five officer-involved shootings, most of them taking place in two jurisdictions. See
MacKenzie Ryan, Who Is Getting Shot and Killed in Utah’s Officer-Involved Shootings?, 2KUTV
(Sept. 25, 2020), https://kutv.com/news/2news-investigates/oici-2020 [https://perma.cc/7JETFV8M].
331. As of 2016, a survey of Utah residents indicated a greater preference for capital
punishment than the rest of the United States. See Jennifer Dobner, Support for Death Penalty
Stronger in Utah Than Nationally, Poll Shows, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 11, 2016, 7:50 PM),
https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=4452272&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc/4SV4-EQV3].
More recent polling, however, shows diminished public support for the death penalty. See
McKenzie Romero, Support for the Death Penalty Waning in Utah, Study Says, DESERET NEWS
(Feb. 10, 2018, 1:53 PM), https://www.deseret.com/2018/2/10/20639702/support-for-the-deathpenalty-waning-in-utah-study-says [https://perma.cc/ASC5-HGZL].
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if that jurisdiction has a troublesome history of police violence, as South
Carolina does.332 South Carolina may also conduct more frequent
executions. At present, there are three men on its death row who have
exhausted their appeals, and the state is eager to execute them.333
Although South Carolina has not selected police officers as executioners
at this time, its decision to rely on employees of the Department of
Corrections does not eliminate all constitutional problems.
While the firing squad may satisfy constitutional criteria regarding
pain, the crucial difference is that the features of the method, not the pain
it causes, are inconsistent with the values the Eighth Amendment should
protect.334 The death penalty relies on retribution—expressions of
community outrage and moral judgment—for its underlying justification,
which must be controlled through process for its legitimacy within the
justice system. When community outrage becomes part of the process of
conducting executions, rather than expressing moral condemnation, the
death penalty may become an exercise in retaliation and vengeance.335 As
Section III.C explores, the purportedly social-stabilizing functions of
retribution in capital punishment may become destabilizing, undermining
legitimacy of punishment and raising the question of whether such a
punishment serves any legitimate function.

332. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 118, 128–29 and accompanying text.
334. See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 429 (Fla. 1999) (Shaw, J., dissenting)
(“Although pain is an important indicator of cruelty, it is not the only indicator—for a method of
execution can involve minimal pain and yet still be extraordinarily cruel. To meet the requirement
that a punishment not be impermissibly cruel, a method of execution also must entail no undue
violence, mutilation, or disgrace . . . .”).
335. Scholars have raised concerns about vengeance in response to the Court’s decision to
allow victim impact testimony and the increasing role victims may play in sentencing. See, e.g.,
SARAT, supra note 98, at 43–59 (discussing the victims’ rights movement and vengeance); Austin
Sarat, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Victims, Retribution, and George Ryan’s Clemency,
82 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1355 (2004) (“The victims’ rights movement points to the difficulty of
‘reconciling grief and rage and vengefulness with practicable moral enforcements of civil
association . . . [and] of reconciling a cultural preoccupation with vengeance and . . . forms of
legal punishment which deny it.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Terry Aladjem, Vengeance &
Democratic Justice: American Culture and the Limits of Punishment 3 (1992) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review))); Jonathan Simon, Fearless Speech in
the Killing State: The Power of Capital Crime Victim Speech, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1377, 1383–87
(2004). See generally Regina Austin, Documentation, Documentary, and the Law: What Should
Be Made of Victim Impact Videos?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 979 (2010) (discussing the lack of
relevance or probative value of victim impact videos); Bennett Capers, Crime Music, 7 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 749 (2010) (explaining how music in victim impact videos is often covertly prejudicial
and may emotionally impact a jury).
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C. The Myth of Social Stabilization
The legitimacy of the criminal justice system depends upon public
support and a belief in the justness, accuracy, and fairness of that
system.336 Failures of justice undermine the perceived legitimacy of this
system, as do public perceptions of unfairness in meting out punishment.
Gregg insisted that by allowing capital punishment to express the
community’s anger at certain offenses or offenders, capital punishment
may restore faith in the justice system and prevent acts of vigilantism and
unsanctioned violence that are contrary to this system.337 Professor Sarat
has theorized that the United States’ preference for capital punishment is
linked to our “deep attachment to popular sovereignty.”338 It is unclear
whether capital punishment truly serves these goals, especially because
judicial deference to legislative and administrative preference
undermines procedures that give capital punishment an appearance of
legitimacy.339
As a matter of capital punishment procedure, an insistence on process
to determine whether someone should die is intended to separate out
instinctual, vengeful retribution and offer a judicially tested account of
that offender’s desert. It is supposed to be distinct from the kind of
violence it is punishing. Likewise, executions and other forms of state
violence supposedly draw legitimacy from their status as acts that are
distinct from the sorts of violence they are intended to prevent or respond
to and their provenance as exercises of government power rather than
vigilantism.340 Yet, this violence undermines its own legitimacy because,
despite the best efforts of judges and legislatures, it relies on
impermissible motives and substantial discretion of executive officers,
and encourages community brutality.341 Treating violence imposed
through a judicial process as distinct from unlawful violence fails when

336. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 453–54 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); ROBINSON
& ROBINSON, supra note 314, at 218 (“[A] criminal law that is seen by the community as regularly
doing injustice and failing to do justice is one that is likely to provoke resistance and subversion
and to lose the power to harness social and normative influence.”).
337. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
338. SARAT, supra note 98, at 17.
339. See id. at 20–21; see also United States v. Higgs, No. 20–927, 141 S. Ct. 645, 646
(2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for allowing executions without resolving
legal claims); Higgs, 141 S. Ct. at 648–49 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (same). The same can be
said of execution procedures, which too often lack the hallmarks of democratic decision-making.
See Berger, supra note 20, at 17–18, 39; Klein, supra note 6, at 972–73.
340. SARAT, supra note 98, at 21.
341. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 344–45 (Marshall, J., concurring); SARAT, supra note 98, at
15 (“State killing damages us all, calling into question the extent of the difference between the
killing done in our name and the killing that all of us would like to stop and, in the process,
weakening, not strengthening, democratic political institutions.”).
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the primary justification for lawful violence is that the popular will
demands death.342
More than any other member of the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall
recognized the potential of the Eighth Amendment. “If retribution alone
could serve as a justification for any particular penalty, then all penalties
selected by the legislature would by definition be acceptable means for
designating society’s moral approbation of a particular act.”343 Justice
Marshall reasoned that reliance on society’s moral outrage as a sole or
primary justification for punishment was inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment, which “limits the avenues through which vengeance can be
channeled.”344 He also questioned whether the majority correctly
identified social stabilization as a function of capital punishment or
whether it was a conclusion that “it is appropriate that society make the
judgment and carry it out.”345 From this perspective, one that the Court
has admittedly not accepted, a punishment may not be painful, but it fails
to serve legitimate justifications for punishment when it relies on
motivations for punishment that are inconsistent with the values of the
Eighth Amendment. Popular will alone is an inadequate justification for
imposing a particular penalty if constitutional principles restrain
legislators and the people from doing so.346
This problem has always existed in capital punishment, and the firing
squad illustrates it. While retribution may dictate that an offender should
be punished for the bad acts he has done, pointing to community
preference as a justification for a type of punishment, rather than the
general imposition of punishment, relies on an underlying framework of
vengeance and populist preference. Justice Marshall argued in Furman
that community outrage is not a legitimate justification for punishment,
even if retribution partially justifies punishment.347 The same applies to
methods of execution. Even if community outrage demands a violent and
painful death,348 the Eighth Amendment is intended to prevent that
because it prevents punishments that are excessive and serve no
342. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The mere fact that the
community demands the murderer’s life in return for the evil he has done cannot sustain the death
penalty, for as Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens remind us, ‘the Eighth Amendment demands
more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society.’” (quoting id. at
182 (plurality opinion))).
343. Furman, 408 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., concurring).
344. Id. at 345 (“Were this not so, the language would be empty and a return to the rack and
other tortures would be possible in a given case.”).
345. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
346. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 331–32 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits imposition of “excessive or unnecessary penalties . . . even though popular
sentiment may favor them”).
347. Id. at 344–45; see Gardner, supra note 24, at 124.
348. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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legitimate purpose.349 Giving communities a hand in methods of
execution draws upon the populist justifications the Court relied on in
Gregg to justify the imposition of the penalty. Carrying out the penalty
cannot be an exercise in community preference for methods of execution
or community involvement—reliance on community outrage
demonstrates how the penalty diminishes human dignity and encourages
violence.
These issues arise in policing and violence. The legitimacy of policing
requires support as well as tangible proof that the police are behaving
fairly and in compliance with the law. Police are part of the community
in which they live and work, yet policing culture increasingly emphasizes
the divide between them and us.350 The growing personalization of
policing culture, as well as the history of police involvement in acts of
vigilantism and unsanctioned brutality, echoes the history of the death
penalty. Requiring police officers to volunteer ensures that nobody who
does not want to participate in an execution has to, but it also reflects
sufficient confidence that officers will volunteer—and legislative
confidence that the role of executioner is appropriate for police officers.
Like capital punishment, for policing to be legitimate, the acts of
violence that police engage in should not be the same as the violence
police are intended to control. And, like capital punishment, violence in
policing blurs those lines. When police behave lawlessly, undermine the
judicial process, act violently, or are not held accountable for unlawful
actions, they undermine the legitimacy of policing. A popular preference
for more aggressive, intrusive policing cannot justify the imposition of an
unconstitutional policing regime.351 The state’s monopoly on violence
requires it and the actors it empowers to not reenact the crimes it prohibits
and examine more thoroughly the potentially impermissible motives
behind possibly lawful actions.
Community involvement—even by police—in executions represents
the endurance of localized principles that capital punishment has by and
large left behind. A direct community connection has vestiges of “frontier
justice” or lynch law. To apply such a method of execution may have a
direct relationship to the flavor of populist retributivism that permeates
Gregg and other capital punishment decisions. Indeed, the Court justified
capital punishment on those grounds.352 But personalizing executions
encourages community sentiments of vengeful retribution and only
reinforces the greater preference for vengeance underlying capital
349. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
350. See Stoughton, Principled Policing, supra note 141, at 651.
351. But see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 73–74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that citizens of Chicago could give police the power to exercise substantial discretion in
enforcing vague laws).
352. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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punishment. When punishment begins to take on characteristics more
closely associated with vigilantism and extrajudicial violence, populist
retribution’s purportedly social-stabilizing functions may prove to be
destabilizing. This threat is more acute when the punishers are people
tasked with significant authority over the whole population, and who
already lack adequate restraint that prevents them from engaging in
unlawful, extrajudicial violence. Just as procedural mechanisms
purport—and fail—to hold police accountable, relying on a veneer of
legality through process in capital punishment also fails to address
underlying fatal flaws.
D. Retribution and Choice
If the firing squad is to be a viable method of execution, there must be
individuals able to carry out executions. One option might be civilian
volunteers.353 But such a proposal fails to resolve the underlying problem
of relying on raw populist preference in executions and affording an
opportunity to bring vengeance into the execution chamber.354 Such a
proposal would offer a legitimating gloss on vigilantism and undermine
legitimate penological goals.
Using existing execution teams made up of employees of departments
of correction is another option—those employees already participate in
executions. This may, however, risk botched executions, especially if
employees have inadequate expertise with firearms. When the question
of using correctional employees came up in Utah, the bill’s sponsor
emphasized that this would not be a responsibility for the department of
corrections and that the police officers who carried out executions would
volunteer to do so.355 Legislators did not consider police officers’ mental
health in this conversation—instead, they focused on voluntary
participation. By contrast, South Carolina has designated volunteer
corrections employees as executioners—and taken other steps that may
impact those employees’ well-being, even if they did volunteer.356 South
Carolina will only use three executioners and all of their rifles will have
live ammunition, eliminating the traditional approach that provides
353. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, What If Citizens Chosen at Random Carried Out
Executions?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/09/
what-if-citizens-chosen-at-random-carried-out-executions/244752/ [https://perma.cc/GL2Y-8ZK6].
354. See Gardner, supra note 24, at 124 (discussing why involving civilians in firing squad
executions is a bad idea).
355. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. South Carolina’s developing protocols will
also use volunteers, although it has not yet identified who those volunteers will be. See Catherine
Welch, South Carolina Prepares to Bring Firing Squads to Death Row, WFAE (July 14, 2021,
6:00 AM), https://www.wfae.org/south-carolina-news/2021-07-14/south-carolina-prepares-tobring-firing-squads-to-death-row [https://perma.cc/X28D-L9XQ].
356. See Press Release, South Carolina Dep’t of Corr., supra note 136.
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executioners with doubt as to whether they fired the fatal shot.357 Several
executioners in South Carolina have recently described the long-term
negative impacts of participation in executions on their mental and
emotional health.358 Executing someone in a more violent way that
eliminates rituals permitting deniability—even if the executioners
volunteer—may enhance the negative effects that executioners already
experience.359
Utah has always had enough volunteers.360 The Warrior ethos, as
discussed above, might lend a way for officers to justify firing squad
participation.361 Ethical tenets of policing caution against excessive
force362 but lack the medical community’s absolute prohibition on
participating in executions.363 The power to use force is, after all, a key
element of policing.364 Even if a national policing organization issued a
statement critiquing participation, officers may still volunteer. Despite
physicians’ general refusal to participate in lethal-injection executions,
states have managed (albeit with errors), and some physicians have
participated anyway.365
The problems this Article describes should not bar prisoners from
alleging that the firing squad is a readily available alternative method of
execution. Under Baze-Glossip, prisoners who bring constitutional
challenges to a state’s method of execution must demonstrate that the
method presents a substantial risk of severe pain and identify a readily
available alternative that substantially reduces that risk.366 This is a

357. Id.
358. See Chiara Eisner, They Executed People for the State of South Carolina. For Some, it
Nearly Destroyed Them, STATE (Jan. 4, 2022, 12:24 PM), https://www.thestate.com/news/
local/crime/article254201328.html [https://perma.cc/7L33-8GEN].
359. South Carolina, in fact, may not have relied on volunteers to staff its execution teams
before. Jim Harvey, who supervised prisons and developed execution processes, emphasized that
executioners were “hand-picked,” rather than volunteers. See id.
360. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
362. See Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,
https://www.theiacp.org/resources/law-enforcement-code-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/75S7-98P6]
(“With no compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will enforce the
law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never employing
unnecessary force or violence . . . .”).
363. Cf. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 66 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that
changing a lethal injection protocol is not feasible if it requires participation “either in carrying
out the execution or in training those who carry out the execution—by persons whose professional
ethics rules or traditions impede their participation”).
364. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 137, 187 and accompanying text (discussing physician participation).
366. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1121 (2019); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863,
877 (2015); Baze, 553 U.S. at 50–52 (plurality opinion).
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significant hurdle.367 The alternative method of execution must be
“feasible” and “readily implemented,” and “the inmate’s proposal must
be sufficiently detailed to permit a finding that the State could carry it out
‘relatively easily and reasonably quickly.’”368 Under these circumstances,
a decision to pick Utah’s firing squad protocol as an alternative method
of execution is sensible. It is proven, easily implemented, and readily
available.369
States’ choices about execution methods and procedures are distinct
from prisoners’ choices. The state’s choice is an extension of its authority
to punish, and that choice conveys intended and incidental messages
about that authority. State decisions involve issues of legitimacy,
democratic process, and the immediate and long-term consequences
associated with executions, including avoiding litigation.370 States,
however, should be cautious when selecting methods of execution that
are implemented in ways that potentially undermine the legitimacy of
their punishments or invite additional brutality. Prisoners do not share
this burden. Prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims are intended to protect
human rights, dignity, and prevent pain and suffering.371 A prisoner
seeking to avoid a not-insubstantial risk of a botched lethal injection
execution may be forced to select a more violent method because that is
the only choice the Supreme Court has left to him. Prisoners’ choices,
therefore, do not have the same impact on the legitimacy of punishment
as legislative or judicial decisions.
This problem of police executioners is especially acute because
legislators seem to be disinclined to think about the consequences—and
they are the primary government body equipped to do that. The Supreme
Court defers substantially to states’ legislative and administrative
367. See Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1130–33; Zagorski v. Haslam, 139 S. Ct. 20, 21 (2018)
(mem.) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay and denial of certiorari).
368. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1129 (quoting McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 488, 493 (8th
Cir. 2017)).
369. See id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining that a prisoner might satisfy the
readily available alternative component of the Baze-Glossip test by “adequately plead[ing]” the
firing squad). Initially some courts had rejected the firing squad as an alternative because it was
not authorized by state law. See, e.g., Boyd v. Warden, Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 868–
70 (11th Cir. 2017). In Bucklew, the Supreme Court clarified that an alternative method of
execution need not be authorized by state law. 139 S. Ct. at 1128 (“An inmate seeking to identify
an alternative method of execution is not limited to choosing among those presently authorized
by a particular State’s law.”). But see Gardner, supra note 24, at 123–24 (concluding the firing
squad is likely unconstitutional because of the potential for pain and the risk of “public
vengeance”).
370. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
371. Of course, prisoners who may choose between certain methods of execution may send
expressive messages by that choice. See GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 168 (“[John Albert Taylor]
told me he opted for the firing squad because ‘It is symbolic to me. I maintain[] my innocence. If
they put a bullet in me they are murdering me. It is the most hassle and the most expensive.’”).
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judgments about carrying out executions.372 Its opinions on methods of
execution repeatedly insist that the Court has never found a method of
execution unconstitutional.373 Based on their deferential posture to
decisions about capital punishment, courts are simply not likely to pay
attention to these problems. Based on past police participation in
executions, it is less likely that police will object either.
Police kill the residents of the United States at an alarming rate.374 A
decision to authorize law enforcement officers to participate in firing
squads may create uneasy parallels to other countries whose police
departments are known to conduct extrajudicial executions.375 Outrage
over police shootings, especially those that lack valid justification for
violence,376 has proved to destabilize public confidence in the police.377
Police officers may be an arm of the state’s mechanism to enforce the
laws, but they are not a typical part of the state’s punishment
mechanism—their role in the justice system ends before punishment can
be lawfully administered. Police wield considerable power over people
in a way that corrections employees do not. Thus, the power dynamics at
issue are distinct. Corrections employees lack power over the
unincarcerated. By contrast, the power to police applies to everyone—
and it is not a power that allows its wielder to punish.

372. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms
in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2038–40, 2082–84 (2011); Berger,
supra note 270, at 959–76; supra notes 271–73 and accompanying text.
373. See Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1124; Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 869 (2015); Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008) (plurality opinion).
374. See supra note 190 (identifying the number of people killed by the police annually in
the United States).
375. See, e.g., Manuela Andreioni & Ernesto Londoño, “License to Kill”: Inside Rio’s
Record Year of Police Killings, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/05/18/world/americas/brazil-rio-police-violence.html [https://perma.cc/52EM-ZRBW];
More Than 7,000 Killed in the Philippines in Six Months, as President Encourages Murder,
AMNESTY INT’L UK (May 18, 2020, 5:53 PM), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/philippinespresident-duterte-war-on-drugs-thousands-killed [https://perma.cc/DMV8-DELY].
376. See, e.g., Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/FV3F-UTJF]; Derrick Bryson Taylor, No Charges for Second Officer Involved
in Shooting of Oscar Grant, D.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/12/us/oscar-grant-charges-anthony-pirone.html [https://perma.cc/VX69-V7SD]; Michael
Levenson, Grand Jury Votes Not to Indict Buffalo Police Officers Accused of Shoving Protester,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/nyregion/martin-guginobuffalo-police.html [https://perma.cc/H25W-K46B].
377. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The legitimacy of punishment depends on how societies punish.
Drawing volunteer police officers from the jurisdiction where the crime
took place demonstrates issues in the social aspects of punishment,
reflecting underlying motivations of vengeance and outrage.378 It is
difficult to decide whether it is more troubling that legislators see this as
an appropriate role for police officers, or that police officers are willing
to volunteer to do it. It is unknown why South Carolina selected
corrections employees instead of police as executioners, but that choice
merely puts a veneer of official formality over a punishment that is
consistently driven by vengeance.
Reliance on “community outrage retribution”379 to justify capital
punishment should not extend to executions. As this Article has
discussed, doing so may have significant destabilizing effects on the
overall system. These parallels can be seen in the response to police
violence. Punishment in the ordinary course of policing is too often
retaliatory and unlawful “street justice.” Further operationalizing police
to conduct executions risks destabilizing effects upon the criminal legal
system—something capital punishment per se routinely tests. It does so
by undermining community trust, potentially incentivizing additional
violence through encouraging negative aspects of policing culture, and
inviting vengeful motives. Using police officers as firing squad
executioners draws upon community members with significant power to
kill the powerless. It blurs the boundaries between punishment and
unlawful violence, enacting punishment as an exercise in communityoriented populist retribution. In so doing, it destabilizes the system it
purports to uphold.

378. See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 31 (1990) (“Modern penal
systems may try to achieve utilitarian objectives, and to conduct themselves rationally and
unemotively, but at an underlying level there is still a vengeful, motivating passion which guides
punishment and supplies its force.”).
379. See Flanders, supra note 231, at 456.

